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case, when the profits are unequally divided, that is, unequally as
regards the share of the capital, the same rule prevails, and that is
quite independent of the circumstance whether the excess of
profits is given for services or given to a sleeping partner for the
use of his name or otherwise. When the partnership comes to an
end, the right to the share of the profits comes to an end also; and
you distribute the assets, after providing for the profits earned up
to the time of the dissolution in proportion to the partners' shares
of the partnership capital. That is the general rule bf law in a
commercial partnership.
Therefore you would distribute the
assets simply in proportion to the capital. This is a commercial
partnership subject to certain statutory provisions. Therefore, if
there were no provision to be found anywhere, you would distribute
the assets in proportion to the capital, and the mere arrangement
for the division of profits inter se during the continuance of the
partnership, would have no direct bearing on the division of
the capital, as distinguished from profits earned up to the time of
the dissolution, after the dissolution of the company."
Of course, where a preference as to capital has been created, as
e have seen was done in one case (Be Bangor, &c., Slate Co.,
Law Rep., 20 Eq. 59), the rule is different; and so as held in
McGregor v. Home Insurance Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 181, where such
a preference is given by statute. In such cases, the preferred
stockholders are entitled to the surplus assets in priority to the
common shareholders.
JoHn D. LAWSON.

St. Louis, Mo.
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Where the damage from a nuisance is irreparable or continuing, and cannot be
measured by ordinary standards, equity may be invoked; and while a chancellor,
in a doubtful case will send a party to a jury, yet when he can act without hesitancy,
he will do so, without a previous determination of complainant's rights by a jury.
Leadi smelting in a fertile district, destroying farming land, poisoning stock, polluting the air with noxious and nauseating vapors, is a dangerous nuisance, and
possesses, as in this case, every element necessary to call forth the exercise of equity
powers. Such a nuisance should be enjoined.
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That defendant's works are a public improvement, cost vast sums of money, and
employ many men, does not alter the rule, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non lcdas."
Where works, such as lead smelting, are about to be erected, it behooves those
about to invest their capital to select a proper locality. It is not the duty of one,.
ignorant of the true character of such works, who is afterwards injured, to notify
the owners of such works at the outstart, that they will become a nuisance, nor does
a failure so to do estop him who is thus injured.
The Courts of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania are clothed with full and independent chancery powers to rewtrain or abate nuisances where they affect private rights.
Neither is the exercise of this power prevented, because the complainant may have
a remedy by indictment or an action at law.
Our equity system is neither dependent upon our common-law courts, nor is its
jurisdiction servient and inferior thereto.

from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1,
of Allegheny county. In Equity.
This was a bill filed by Joseph P. McIntyre against the Pennsylvania Lead Company. The bill charged that plaintiff was
owner of a fertile farm of about forty-six acres, situate in Allegheny county, which was used for farming purposes; that defendant purchased a tract of land adjoining his farm, and thereon
erected a smelting works, for smelting lead and other minerals, the
works being located within seventy-five feet of said farm; that
defendant's works were so constructed and operated as to emit from
its stacks and chimneys offensive, noxious and poisonous gases,
fumes and vapors, which descended and rested upon plaintiff's
farm, injuriously affecting said farm ; and that they had poisoned
the soil, vegetation and products of the farm; also, that portions
of the farm had already been blasted and the vegetation destroyed,
the injury being continuous; that horses and cattle had died from
eating fodder and grass grown upon the land poisoned by the fumes,
gases and vapors, which were also noxious and offensive to persons
living on the farm, inhaling the same; 'that defendants works were
a continuing nuisance to plaintiff's lands, producing irreparable
injury to him, and that plaintiff, at the time the works were
erected, was ignorant of their character. The prayer was 1st.
Abatement of the nuisance. 2d. That defendant company be
enjoined from operating its works so as harmfully or injuriously
to affect plaintiff's farm or vegetation; and from permitting the
gases, flmes and vapors of said works to descend or fall upon the
land. 3d. General relief.
An answer having been filed, the case was referred to a master,
who reported the facts substantially as set forth by complainant, and
APPEAL
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recommended a decree in accordance with second prayer of complainant's bill.
The defendant excepted to the master's finding. The court,
STOWE, P. J., overruled the exceptions, and confirmed the report.
The defendant appealed to this court.
Hamptrn & Dalzell, for appellant.
George Shiras, Jr., and T. H. Baird Patterson, with -whom
had been Hon. E. VF. Acheson, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GORDON, J.-The power of the Courts of Common Pleas of
Pennsylvania to entertain bills for the restraint or abatement of
nuisances, where they affect piivate rights, is undoubted; neither
is the exercise of this power prevented by the fact that the party
complaining may have a remedy by indictment or by an action at
law: Bunnell's Appeal, 69 Penn. St. 59; Dennis v. Eckhardt, 3
Grant 390.
It is true, indeed, that this power is limited to those cases where
common-law forms of action do not furnish an adequate remedy,
and the chancellor may also refuse to act where greater injury
would result from an injunction than by leaving a party to his
redress before a court and jury: Richards'sAppeal, 57 Penn. St.
105. But where, in ordinary parlance, the damage sought to be
prevented is irreparable, that is, where the wrong is repeated from
time to time, or is of a continuing character, or productive of
damages which cannot be measured by ordinary standards, equity
may be invoked: Commonwealth v. Railroad Company, 12 Harris
159.
The appellant, however, contends that an injunction ought not
to issue until the complainant's right has been established by an
action at law. This suggestion would, in a doubtful case, have
force, for the chancellor, in a case like the present, will act only
when he can do so without hesitancy. If the case be doubtful, he
will refuse to interfere until the right, upon which the claim for
relief is based, is definitely settled by a trial on the common-law
side of the court. But to say that equity cannot move in any ease
until a jury has determined the nuisance to be an existing fact, is
to make our equity system a mere dependent on the common-law
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courts, and its jurisdiction servient and inferior. But a conclusion
such as this does not accord with the intent of the Act of 1836,
for by it the judges of the Common Pleas are clothed, not with
partial and dependent, but with full and independent chancery
powers over all the subjects therein mentioned. We may, then,
adopt the language of EARL, J., (Campbell v. Seaman, "63 N. Y.
568), when speaking of injunctions against nuisances: " It was
formerly rarely issued in the case of a nuisance until the plaintiff's
right had been established at law, and the doctrine which seems
now to prevail in Pennsylvania, that the writ is not a matter of
right, but of grace, to a large extent prevailed. But a suit at law
is no longer necessary, and the right to an injunction in a proper
case, in England and most of the states, is just as fixed and certain
as the right to any other provisional remedy. The writ can right,
fully be demanded to prevent irreparable injury, interminable litigation and a multiplicity of suits, and its refusal in a proper case
would be error to be corrected by an appellate jurisdiction. It is
a matter of grace in no sense except that it rests in the sound discretion of the court."
Nor have our own courts been less ready of adopting the same
doctrine; hence it has been held that an injunction would be issued
to prevent the cutting down of timber and ornamental trees to the
injury of the reversion: Denny v. Brunson, 5 Casey 382; or to
restrain a trespass of a permanent or continuing character: Mason's
Appeal, 60 Penn. St. 26. So may acts of trespass or nuisance
be restrained to prevent a multiplicity of suits, or when such
wrongful acts might become the foundation of an adverse right:
Scheetz's Appeal, 11 Casey 88.
Nor do we understand how Richards's Appeal, 57 Penn. St.
105, can help the defendant, for whilst no one disputes the position
that a bill for the suppression of a nuisance may be dismissed on
general demurrer for want of equity, unless it appears from the
subject-matter affected by the alleged nuisance that there is danger
of irreparable mischief, or of an injury such as cannot be adequately compensated in a suit at law, yet, we apprehend, even
under this authority, a general demurrer would scarcely have sufficed to turn the bill before us out of court. In it we find these
several allegations : that the defendant's works are so constructed
as to emit noxious and poisonous gases, fumes and vapors, and that
they are so located that these noxious and poisonous gases fall
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upon the plaintiff's land, thereby poisoning and destroying both
soil and vegetation; that cattle and horses have died from eating
the fodder and herbage thus poisoned; that these fumes and vapors
are offensive and noxious to persons resident upon said farm, and
that these injuries are continuous and irreparable. It would certainly be a very bold solicitor who would risk the admission of such
facts on a general demurrer, and it is a significant fact that the
learned counsel for the defendant have attempted no such experiment.
The bill, then, is sufficient to evoke the action of a court of
equity, and all that remains is to ascertain if the bill be supported
by the evidence. As to this, after a careful examination of the
testimony, we conclude that the findings of the master are correct,
and that the complainant's plaint is fully sustained by the proofs.
And, indeed, it is to be remembered, in limine, that whether a
smelting-house for lead is, or is not, a nuisance, per se, to adjacent
land, depends very much upon its situation.
"If," says BLACKSTONE, "1one erects a smelting-house for lead
so near the land of another, that the vapor and smoke kill his
corn and grass, and damage his cattle therein, this is held to be a
nuisance." All intelligent persons are aware that lead vapors are
poisonous, and this the more so, as they are often, as in the case
in hand, accompanied with arsenic. In this matter we need not
chemists and experts.to teach us, for common experience is sufficient. When, therefore, we learn that the works of the defendant
are to the windward of the plaintiff's land, within seventy-five feet
of his northern line, and but five or six hundred feet from his
farm-house, we need but little evidence to satisfy us that the smoke
from these -works is seriously injurious to his property. But in
addition to what we might naturally expect from the design and
character of this business, and which, might in themselves, have
been sufficient to have sustained a bill to restrain the erection of
these works, we have the findings of the master, based on undoubted
testimony, as follows: "That prior to the time the defendant's
smelting operations began, the plaintiff's land was fertile and well
adapted to farming and grazing. That the defendant's works emit
from the chimneys and stacks thereof, in the process of smelting
ores and refuse, and desilvering lead, offensive and poisonous
fumes and vapors, which are blown upon, descend and rest upon
plaintiff's farm, and that lead is thus distributed over said farm to
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a distance of at least fifteen hundred feet from said works. That
these lead fumes and vapors have injuriously affected and are injuriously affecting the plaintiff's farm. That they have lessened the
fertility of a portion of the farm lying nearest the lead works; that
they have poisoned and are poisoning the vegetation and products of
said farm, rendering the latter unfit for consumption, and that
these injuries are continuing. That horses and cattle grazing upon
the plaintiff's farm, and eating the products thereof, have died
from lead poisoning, and that the lead was communicated to them
through the herbage and fodder on which they fed. That the
horses and cows of Jacob Wehrle, who was tenant of the plaintiff's
farm, April 1st 1875, to April 1st 1876, and those of his son,
Frederick Wehrle, that died upon the plaintiff's farm, were.poisoned
in the manner above stated. That since April 1st 1876, the only
crop cultivated upon the farm is corn, which is husked on the
stalk, and the. fodder left on the ground; and no horses, cattle or
live stock of any kind are reared or pastured on the farm. That
the fumes and vapors from the defendant's works are offensive and
nauseating to persons living upon the land or inhaling them. That
the plaintiff's farm is greatly diminished in value, by reason of the
lead deposited and being deposited upon it from the defendant's
works. Its rental value is, also, greatly depreciated."
To this he might well have added, that the plaintiff's farm was
thereby rendered, not only uncomfortable, but dangerous as a place
of human habitation; for a place where not only herbage and
ground are so literally poisoned by deposits of lead, that it is
readily discoverable by chemical analysis; but where at times,
also, the air is so filled with the noxious vapors of lead and arsenic
as to make those sick who encounter them, might certainly be
called dangerous to human health and life.
In this connection, another important circumstance must be
oonsidered; that is, the cumulative character of this injury. It
increases from year to year, not only as the works are enlarged,
but as more and more lead is added to the ground. The deposit
is an indestructible metal, that is neither evaporated nor absorbed,
and necessarily it must accumulate as long as the cause of the
deposit continues. . Hence, as it was observed, at first, even on the
.and nearest the works, the effect was scarcely observable; but as
time went on, it became more and more apparent, until finally the
soil was wholly unfitted for agricultural purposes. So, in like
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manner, may these blighting influences continue until the whole
farm is made barren and unproductive. Thus it is, that we find
in this case every element necessary to call forth the exercise of
equity power. The business complained of is a dangerous nuisance, the injury continuous and cumulative, and the mischief irreparable. If, as in Dennis v. _Eckhardt, 3 Grant 390, a tin shop
was enjoined on account of its noise; or, as in Campbellv. Seaman,
supra, the use of a brick-kiln was restrained, because the vapor
therefrom was destructive toethe plaintiff's trees and vines; much
more should a business be enjoined which is destructive alike to
vegetable and animal life. The rule sic utere tue ut alienum non
icedas, is a most valuable one, and must be maintained, if our
civilization is to be cherished and preserved ; and it is not at all
to the purpose to answer the charge of a violation of this rule, that
the defendant's works have been erected at a great outlay of capital; that they are important to the public at large, and give
employment to many men. Says Wood, in his work on Nuisances,
sect. 794, "A person cannot go on and build extensive works, and
make heavy expenditures of money for the exercise of a trade or business that will invade the premises of another with smoke, noxious
vapors or noisome smells, to an unwarranted or unlawful extent,
and then when called upon to desist, turn around and claim immunity for his trade or business on the ground, that to stop it would
involve him in ruin; nor that it is a necessary result of carrying
on his trade at all, and that he has adopted the most approved
methods known to science, or which human skill has devised; nor
that his trade is a useful one and beneficial to the community, or
to the nation, or that by bringing a large number of workmen into
the community, it has enhanced the value of the plaintiff's property." Where justice is properly administered, rights are never
measured by their mere money value, neither are wrongs tolerated
because it may be to the advantage of the powerful to impose upon
the weak. Whether it be the great corporation with its lead
works, or the mechanic with his tin shop, the rule is the same"so use your own as not to injure others." Moreover, there is,
after all, one underlying principle which influences both, and that
is private gain. Lead works and tin shops alike may result incidently in the public good, but this is only an incident, for the
primary object which induces the exercise of either trade is personal good; therefore, to neither party is the general community
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under any special obligation, and as a consequence, there is no good
reason why the rules of law should be relaxed in the one case rather
than the other.
Again, we cannot but regard this company as unfortunate in the
selection of a place for the erection of its works. To undertake
the business of lead smelting in the midst of a rich suburban valley,
least of
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Decree affirmed.
A nuisance is literally anything that
causes annoyance. In law it is generally defined as " anything that worketh
hurt, inconvenience or damage." 3

Black. Com. 215. Nuisances are of twc
kinds, public nuisances and private
nuisances. Hawkins, in his Pleas of
the Crown, has defined a public nuisance
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'as an offence against the public, by
doing anything injurious to all the king's
subjects, or by omitting to do that which
the common g-,A requires." A private
nuisance has been defined as "anything
done to the hurt or annoyance of the
lands, tenements or hereditaments of
another."
The usual remedy for a public nuisance
is by indictment, and for a private
nuisance by an action on the case, but
equity courts will exercise jurisdiction
over both. "Courts of chancery exercisejurisdiction both as to common or
public and private nuisances, by restraining persons from setting them up, by
inhibiting their continuance or compelling their abatement :" Harvey v. Dewoody, 18 Ark. 252. In a recent case
in New Jersey, Attorney - General v.
lBrmvm, 24 N. J. Eq.

89, 91, we find

the chancellor declaring that, while the
jurisdiction of courts of equity to redress the grievance of public nuisances
by injunction is undoubted and clearly
established, yet they will entertain jurisdiction in such cases with great reluctanee.
While the general rule is that in the
case of public nuisances the state alone
can complain, yet a nuisance may be
both public and private in its character,
in which case one who suffers special
damage therefrom can invoke the protection of the courts: Park v. C. J- S.
Radroad Co., 43 Iowa 636; Adams v.
Popham, 76 N. Y. 410; Givens v. Van
Studd!ford, 4 Mo. App. 498, 503; Green
v. Lake, 54 Miss. 540; Whitfidd v.
Rogers, 26 Id. 84, 87 ; Kittle v. Fremont. 1 Kans. 337 ; Venard v. Cross, 8
Id. 248; Hamilton v. Whitridge, 11
Md. 128; Zimmerman v. Union Canal
(o., 1 W. & S. 346. And several separate owners of distinct property interests that are alike affected by the nuisance
complained of, may join as complainants,
without the attorney-general, where the
grievance has one source, and operates
,n the same general manner against all:
VOL. XXX.-83

Robinson v. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290 ; Middleton v. Flat River Booming Co., 27 Id.
533 ; Grant v. Schmidt, 22 Minn. I ;
Palner v. lWaddell, 22 Kans. 352 ; Cadigan v. Brown, 120 Mass. 493.
But it is not every case which furnisles
a right of action against a party for a
nuisance that justifies a court of equity
in granting remedial or preventive relief.
Attorney-General v. Nichol, 16 Vesey Jr.
338 ; Rosser v. Randolph, 7 Porter
(Ala.) 238, 248; Ray v. Lynes, 10
Ala. 64; Laney v. Jasper, 39 Ill. 46,
52 ; Parker v. lWinnipiseogee Lake Cotton, 4-c., Co., 2 Black 545; .Kirkman v.
Handy, 11 Hum. (Tenn.) 409; Brown
v. Central Railroad Co., 83 N. C. 130.
"A court of equity will interfere when
the injury by the wrongful act of the
adverse party will be irreparable, as
where the loss of health, the loss of trade,
the destruction of the means of subsistence, or the ruin of the property must
ensue : Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake
Cotton, 4-c., Co., supra. "Irreparable
injury is the foundation for interventiop
by injunction; not irreparable because
so small that it may not be estimated,
but because likely to be so great as to be
incapable of compensation in damages."
Tno.xr'so,,
C. J., in Rhodes v. Dunbar,
57 Penn. St. 274. "It is difficult, if
not impossible, to define in advance all
the eases in which the court would be
authprized thus to interfere, but it may
be safely laid down as applicable to this
class of cases, that it must be satisfactorily shown that the proposed erection
would inflict an irreparable injury, such
a one as could not be adequately compensated in damages ; or it must threaten
materially to impair the comfort of the
existence of those living near it, to entitle those aggrieved to the aid of the
preventive justice of the law :" Rosser
v. Randolph, supra. "If
one man
creates intolerable smells near his neighbor's homestead, or by excavations
threatens to undermine his house, or
cuts off his access to the street by build-
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tugs or ditches, or in any other way destroys the comfortable, peaceful and quiet
occupation of his homestead, he injures
him irrecovably. No man holds the
comfort of his home for sale, and no
man is willing to accept in lieu of it an
award of damages. If equity could not
enjoin such a nuisance, the writ ought
to be dispensed with altogether, and the
doctrine of irreparable mischief might be
dismissed as meaningless. A nuisance
which affects one in his business is less in
degree, but it may still be irreparable,
because it may break up the business,
destroy its good will, and inflict damages
which are incapable of measurement,
because the elements of reasonable certainty are not to be obtained for their
computation :" COOLEY, J., in Edwards
v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Alich. 48. The
language of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, in the recent case of Brown v.
Carolina Central Railroad Co., 83 N. C.
128, decided in 1880, is worthy of repetition in this connection. "Upon the
establishment of the nuisance," said the
court, "as the plaintiff insists is done in
this case by the verdict of the jury, the
grant of process of abatement does not
follow as a matter of course, but on that
event will depend on circumstances, of
which the following will be influential.
The chancellor, in such case, will consider whether be will leave the party to
his common-law remedy, or order an
abatement; and as connected therewith,
his determination will, and ought to be,
influenced against ordinary abatement,
by the fact, that the structure from which
the nuisance arises, is useful to the
defendant, and the injury therefrom to
the plaintiff trifling, and susceptible of
adequate compensation in damages; and
by the further fact of a great public
benefit overbalancing the private injury,
in which case, the private injury should,
as established by the authorities, be subAs to
ordinated to the public good."
when equity will interfere by injunction,
324;
aee also Wahie v. Rienbach, 76 Ill.

Wolcott V.3elick, 3 Stockton (N. J.)
204, 207. It is to be noted, thata work
authorized by the law-making power,
canzot be a nuisance, if executed in the
authorized manner and in the authorized
place: Rex v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30;
Transportation Co, v. Chicago, 99 U. S.
635; Attorney-General v. N. Y. 6- L.
B. Railroad Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 49. It
would be a legal solecism to call that a
public nuisance, which is permitted. by
competent authority: Grand Rapids 6"
Indiana Railroad Co. v. Heisel, 38 Mich.
62, 70. See, too, People v. Detroit 4
Pank Road Co., 37 Id. 195, where a
suit in equity, in the name of the state,
to enjoin the erection of a new toll gate
structure in place of a former one removed by the company, was dismissed
for the reason, that the state could not
prosecute as a nuisance that which itself
had authorized. See also Danville Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 73 Penn. St.
38; Randle v. Pacific Railroad Co., 65
Mo. 325, 332.
Upon the question as to whether an act
constitutes a nuisance, it is not necessary
to inquire into the intention of the person
in doing the act: Bonnell v. Smnith, 53
Iowa 281. The fact that a business is
a lawful one, and that it is conducted in
the best possible manner, will not prevent it from being a nuisance. In St.
Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H.
L. Cas. 642, the court asked the jury
whether the business complained of,
smelting copper, was an ordinary one,
and whether it was conducted in a
proper manner. The jury answered tho
first question in the affirmative, and also
said, that the business was conducted
"in as good a manner as possible ;" but
a verdict was had for the plaintiff below,
as the business materially diminished the
value of his property. See also Cooper
v. Randall, 53 Ill. 24. To constitute a
business a nuisance, it is not necessary
that the offensive smells should be unwholesome ; it is sufficient that they are
such as render persons uncomfortable in
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the enjoyment of their property: Rex v.
White, 1 Burr. 333; Burditt v. Swenson,

17 Texas 502. But to make the business a nuisance, it must be such to people
of ordinary nature or condition. It is
not sufficient that it is simply offensive
to delicate and sensitive organizations.
This is illustrated by the recent case of
Rit v. Pillips, 50 Ga. 132, in which
the business complained of was the
manufacturing of a commercial fertilizer.
"1Ve suspect," said the court, "that the
stomach which sickens at the smell of an
article now in such common use, which
in its worst form-Peruvian guano-is
carried by the ship-load thousands of
miles. is not a stomach of an ordinary
kind. It- is too nice, perhaps from some
discase, for ordinary life. It is not
against exceptionable organizations that
the nuisance arises. To make a thing a
nuisance, it ought to be of such a character as would hurt or annoy in the legal
sense of those words, ordinary people,
not nice, suscepible, sickly people."
To ask a court to enjoin a person from
carrying on a lawful business, conducted
on one's own premises, and in as good a
manner as possible, is to invoke an extraordinary power, not to be used unless
the exigencies of the case are of such a
nature as imperatively demand such
interposition. " A court exercising the
power of a chancellor,"

said AGNEW,

J., "whose arm may fall with crushing
force upon the every-day business of
men, destroying lawful means of support,
and diverting property from legitimate
uses, cannot approach such cases with
too jnuch caution :" Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Penn. St. 102. In a case in
Mississippi, the court say, "Perhaps the
most delicate jurisdiction ever exercised
by a court of chancery, is to restrain by
injunction, the use of property by the
owner, on the allegation that such use
will be annoying, or injurious to the
property of another :" Green v. Lake,
54 Miss. 540. And in the case last
cited, it is said, that if the grievances

can be removed by the aid of science and
skill, a court of equity will go no further
than to require those things to be done.
See also Minke v. Ifopeman, 87 fll. 450.
It is important to inquire at what time
equity interferes. Will an injunction
issue before the complainant's right is
established by an action at law? The
question is asked in the particular case,
and answered by saying, that a prior
action at law is only necessary in doubtful cases, as the Chancellor "will act
only where be can do so without hesitancy." Lord Chancellor BROUGHAM,
in Earl of Ripen v. Hobart, 3 Myl. & K.
169, 179, laid down the rule as follows:
"If the thing sought to be prohibited, is
in itself a nuisance, the court will interfere to stay irreparable mischief, without
waiting for the result of a trial ; and will
according to the circumstances, direct an
issue, or allow an action, and, if need be,
expedite the proceedings, the injunction
being in the mean time continued. But
where the thing sought to be restrained
is not unavoidably and in itself noxious,
but only something, which may according
to circumstances, prove so, the court will
refuse to interfere until the matter has
been tried at law, generally by an action,
though in particular cases an issue may
be directed for the satisfaction of the
court, where an action could not be
framed so as to meet the question."
The rule as thus laid down by the Lord
Chancellor, was approved by Mr. Justice
DILLON in the late case of Flint v. Russell, 5 Dill. 157, where he says of it,
that it is "founded on the soundest of
reasons." It has also been quoted and
approved in other cases: Kirk£man v.
Handy, 11 Hump. (Tenn.) 410. In Illinois, the court say, that equity will interfere by %injunction,before the fact that
the business is a nuisance has been established at law, in those cases in which
there is danger of irreparable loss, or
that material injury may take place before a trial at law could be had: Wahle
v. Reinbach, 76 11. 323 ; Minke v. Hop.
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man, 87 Id. 450. See Wlolcott v. 3felick,
3 Stockton (N. J.) 204; Lassater v.
Garfett, 4 Baxter 368 ; Carpenterv. Grisham, 59 Mo. 247; Green v. Lake, 54
Miss. 540 ; Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.
Y. 582; New Boston Co. v. Pottsville
Water Co., 54 Penn. St. 164; Rhodes v.
In Aldrich v.
Dunbar, 57 Id. 274.
Howard, 7 R. I. 87, it is held, that a
bill is not demurrable because it does not
state that the rights of the parties, in
support of the bill, have been settled by
a judgment at law.
The question has been raised whether
the location of a business in a particular
neighborhood may not be a justification
of its maintenance in that particular locality, although the business, if carried
on in other places, might be a nuisance.
The question arose in Ross v. Butler,
19 N. J. Eq. 294, where the chancellor
said : "I find no authority that will warrant the position that the part of a town
which is occupied by tradesmen and mechanics for residences and carrying on
their trades and business, and which contains no elegant or costly dwellings, and
is not inhabited by the wealthy and luxurious, is a proper and convenient place
for carrying on business, which renders
the dwellings there uncomfortable to the
owners and their families by offensive
smells, smoke, cinders or intolerable
noises, even if the inhabitants are themselves artisans, who work at trades occasioning some degree of noise, smoke and
cinders. Some parts of a town may, by
lapse of time, or by prescription, by the
continuance of a number of factories
long enough to have a right as against
every one, be so dedicated to smells,
smoke, noise and dust, that an additional factory, which adds a little to the
common evil, would not be considered
at law a nuisance, or be restrained in
In Wier's Appeal, 74 Penn.
equity."
St. 240, SHAmswooD, J., said: "Carrying on an offensive trade for any number of years in a place remote from buildings and public roads, does not entitle

the owner to continue it in the same
place after houses have been built and
roads laid out in the neighborhood, to
the occupants of which, and travellers
upon which, it is a nuisance. As the city
extends such nuisances should be removed to the vacant grounds beyond the
immediate neighborhood of the residences
of the citizens. This, public policy, as
well as the health and comfort of the
population of the city demand." In
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S.
663, the Supreme Court of the United
States say that it is no justification that
the party complaining of a nuisance
came voluntarily within its reach. Pure
air and the comfortable enjoyment of
property are as much rights belonging to
it as the right of possession and occupancy. "If population, where there
was none before, approaches a nuisance,
it is the duty of those liable at once to
put an end to it." And in St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. C.
642, the Lord Chancellor, in speaking
of a suitable location for the business,
said: "The word 'suitable' unquestionably cannot carry with it this consequence, that a trade may be carried on
in a particular locality, the consequence
of which trade. may be injury and destruction to the neighboring property.-"
In that case there was evidence that the
whole neighborhood was studded with
manufactories, yet it was held an improper place, as it injured materially the
complainant's property. See, too, Robinson v. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290 ; Gilbert
v. Showerman, 23 Id. 448; Brady v.
Weeks, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 159 ; Dittman
v. Repp, 50 Md. 516.
It may not be uninteresting to notice
some of the leading cases on the subject
of nuisances arising from the carrying
on of business. The earliest case on
this subject is probably that of Ric de D v.
Richards, 4 Assize Book, fol. 3, p. 6, in
which a lime-kiln was held a nuisance,
the vapors arising therefrom in the
process of lime-burning escaping over
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premises of the plaintiff, by reason of
which his trees were scorched and burnt.
In Poynton v. Gill, 2 Rolle's Abr. 140,
the business was similar to that complained of in the particular case, that of
smelting lead. The plaintiff'had lost a
cow and two horses, and his grass and
trees had been spoiled. The court said
that although the trade was lawful, it
did not warrant the defendant in inflicting injury upon the plaintiff, and that it
ought to be carried on "in waste places
and great commons, remote from enclosures, so that no damages may happen
to the proprietors of land next adjoining."
The injury complained of in
St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11
H. L. C. 642, was in its nature very
like that complained of in the particular
case, although the relief sought was different, damages being asked for. The
business carried on was that of smelting
copper, instead of lead, and large quantities of noxious gases, vapors, and
other noxious matter issued from the
works and diffused themselves over the
land and premises of the plaintiff,
whereby his hedges, trees, shrubs, fruit
and herbage were greatly injured, and
his cattle were rendered unhealthy. He
was held to be entitled to damages. In
Campbell v. Seamen, 63 N. Y. 576, the
business complained of was that of brick
burning, and tle court held that the
complainant was entitled to an injunction, as it appeared that noxious gases
were generated which descended upon
complainant's lands, injuring and destroying his trees and vegetation. It
was held to be immaterial that the
damage done was to ornamental trees
and shrubbery.
" The plaintiffs had
built," said the court, "a costly mansion, and had laid out their grounds and
planted them with ornamental and useful
trees and vines for their comfort and
enjoyment. How can one be compensated in damages for the destruction of
his ornamental trees and the flowers and
vines which surround his home? How
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can a jury estimate their value in dollars
and cents? The fact that trees and
vines are for ornament or luxury entitles
them no less to the protection of the
law. Every one has the right to surround himself with articles of luxury
and he will be no less protected than one
who provides himself only with articles
of necessity. The law will protect a
flower or a vine as well as an oak.
These damages are irreparable too,
because the trees and vines cannot be
replaced, and the law will not compel a
person to take money rather than the
objects of beauty and utility which he
places around his dwelling to gratify his
taste, or to promote his comfort or his
health. Here the injunction also prevents a multiplicity of suits. The injury is a recurring one, and every time
the poisonous breath from defendant's
brick-kiln sweeps over the plaintiffs'
land, they have a cause of action.
Unless the nuisance be restrained the
litigation would be interminable." In
Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294, the
defendant was about to engage in the
manufacture of pottery, and an injunction was asked to prevent the erection
of buildings to be used for that purpose.
Defendants intended to burn the ware
with pine wood, and complainants alleged that it would result in dense and
offensive smoke and cinders descending
upon their dwellings, injuring furniture.
and impairing health and comfort. An
injunction was granted against using the
building for burning earthenware with
pine wood, or any fuel that would emit
large quantities of dense smoke. "It
is contended," said the chancellor, "that
as the burning will be but twice in a
month, and for twelve hours only, and
that principally at night, it will be so
slight as not to be a material discomfort. ***
I am not aware of any
authority or established principle, holding that a clear, unmistakable nuisance,
which it is intended to commit periodically, will be permitted because it does
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pipes into boats which would convey
them away. An injunction was granted
time, but only for a small portion of it.
the defendant from using
It is surely no justification to a restraining
* * *
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is
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one
wrongdoer that he takes away only
from manufacturing
and
gas,
purifying
one-twenty-eighth of his neighbor's prowould produce any
that
Way
any
in
gas
v.
perty, comfort or life." In Robinson
dwelling in the
persons
to
annoyance
Baugh, 31 Mich. 290, the defendant was
by any smoke,
complainants,
of
houses
employed
He
engaged in forging.
that might
odors,
or
effluvia
other
gases,
steam, and consumed a large amount
from the works. "Unpleasant
issue
four
worked
He
coal.
of bituminous
odors," said the chancellor, "from the
steam-hammers, one of which weighed
very constitution of our nature, render
soot
and
smoke
The
3500 pounds.
us uncomfortable, and when continued
were often borne by the wind in large
or repeated, make life uncomfortable.
complainof
premises
the
to
quantities
To live comfortably is the chief and
ant, so as to be extremely offensive and
most reasonable object of men in acharmful, and the noise was exceedingly
quiring property as the means of attaindisagreeable. An injunction was granted.
ing it ; and any interference with our
In Meigs v. Lister, 23 N. J. Eq. 199,
neighbor in the comfortable enjoyment
the business complained of was that of
of life, is a wrong which the law will
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redress."
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The injunction was allowed.
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Hum. (Tenn.) 406 ; Coker v. Birge, 9
when the wind is in one direction, does
Ga. 425 ; Birrison v. Brooks, 20 Id.
not," so it was said, "affect the right
537; Aldrich v. Howard, 8 R. I. 246:
of complainants to protection. They
249; Burditt v. Swenson, 17 Tex. 501 ;
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Columbus Gas Co. v. Freeland, 12 Ohio
St. 392 ; Ottawa Gas Light Co. v. Tlonipiveland
v. Citizens
(
son, 39 Ill. 599 ;
Gas Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 201 ; Mfanhattan
Gas Co. v. Barker, 36 How. 238; Broadbent v. Inperial Gas Co., 7 DeG., M. &

G. 436 ; Wlatson v. Gas Co., 6 Upper
Canada 262.
As to nuisances from tanneries, see
Rex v. Pappineau, 2 Stra. 686 ; Pinckney v. Ewens, 3 L. T. (N. S.) 741;
Ellis v. State, 7 Blackf. 534; Howell v.
JfcCoy, 4 Rawle 256 ; State v. Street
Conmmissioner, 7 Vroom. (N. J.) 284.
As to slaughter-houses, see Phillips v.
State, 7 Baxter (Tenn.) 152; Fay v.
Vdtman, 100 Mass. 76 ; Attorney-General v. Steward, 20 N. J. Eq. 415;
Minke v. Ilopeman, 87 Ill. 450; Bishop
v. Ianks, 33 Conn. 118. As to cattlepens: Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Grabill, 50 Ill. 241.
As to blacksmith shops, see lWhitney v.
Barthokmew, 21 Conra. 213 ; Norcross v.
Thons, 51 Me. 503 ; Ray v. Lynes, 10
Ala. 64.
As to steam-engines, see Brightman v.
yor, &c.,
Brstol, 65 Me. 426, 435;
of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217
Galbraith v. Oliver, 3 Pittsburgh 79;
Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476.
As to railroads, which are nuisances
if not constructed in a place authorized

by law and operated in a proper manner, see Connmonwealth v. Erie, 4-c., Railroad Co., 27 Penn. St. 339 ; Jlarringtom
v. St. Paul, ,"c., Railroad Co., 17 Minn.
215 ; Stewart v. Ra]inond, 7 S. & M.
568; King v. .lorris "J"Essex Railroaa
Co., 18 'N. J. Eq. 397.
As to soap-boilers, see Re.r v. Pierce,
2 Shower 327 ; Belleny v. 0omb, 17 Fac.
Cas. (Sc.) 159 ; Dana v. Valentine, 5
Mete. 8; Howard v. Lee, 3 Sandf.. 281 ,
Radeahurst v. Coate, 6 Grant's Ch.
(Out.) 140.
A bawdy house is a nuisance, per se:
Givens v. Van Studdfford, 4 Mo. Ap. 503;
Ilamilton v. lilridtqe,11 Md. 128; Ely
v. Board of Supcrrisors, 36 N. Y. 297.
A planing-mill is not a nuisance, per
se: Duncan v. Hayes, 22 N. J. Eq. 25;
Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Penn. St. 274.
A powder-house located in a populous
part of town is, per se, a nuisance:
Cheatham v. Shearon, 1 Swan (Tenn.)
213; Vier's Appeal, 74 Penn. St. 240;
Myers v. M1alcoln, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 292.
A wooden ttouring-mill is not per se,
a nuisance: 31inneapolis Mill Co. v.
Tiffany, 22 Minn. 463. A corn and
flouring-mill in a city is not, per se, a
nuisance: Green v. Lake, 54 Miss. 540.
But it may become a nuisance: Coopet
v. Randall, 53 Il1. 24.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.

S' preme Court of _lfassachusetts.
HARRIS v. CARMODY.
A note and mortgage given by a father to the plaintiff, under threats to prosecute
and imprisor his son for an alleged forgery of the father's name, may be avoided by
the father on the ground of duress.
This defence need not be specially pleaded to a complaint under Gen. Stat. c.
137, to recover possession of the mortgaged premises.

ACTION under Gen. Stat. c. 137, to recover possession of land
conveyed by one of the defendants in a mortgage deed to plaintiff;
the other defendant claimed under a prior unrecorded deed of the
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same premises with notice to the plaintiff. In another suit, the
plaintiff sued the defendant, Lott Carmody, upon several promissory
notes indorsed by him; the defendant set up in that suit, that the
indorsements were not made by him, but his pretended signatures
were forged by his son; and a settlement was made, under which
the defendant gave his note for $1000 secured by a mortgage of
his real estate. In the case at bar, the defendant sought to avoid
this mortgage on the ground of duress. There was evidence that
he was induced to execute it by threats of the prosecution and
imprisonment of his son. The court below instructed the jury as
to what would constitute duress, and then ruled in substance, that
the defendant could avoid the mortgage by proof of duress to his
son. The verdict was for the defendants and the plaintiff excepted.
W. D. Northend and -.

. Stone, for plaintiff.

P. O'Loughlin and Jno. -H. _Raymond, for defendant.
J.-The first question is, as to the correctness of the
ruling excepted to. At common law, as a general rule, the defence
of duress per mina8 must be sustained by proof of threats which
create a reasonable fear of loss of life, or of great bodily harm or
imprisonment of the person to whom they are made, and one man
cannot avoid his obligation by reason of duress to another. There
is a well-settled exception to this rule in the case of husband and
wife, all the authorities agreeing, that each may avoid a contract
if it was made to relieve the other from duress: Sheppard's
Touchst. 61; Metcalf on Contr. 280, note; Robinson v. Gould,
11 Cush. 55, and cases cited. The question whether this exception extends to the relation of parent and child, does not appear to
have been expressly adjudicated. But we find many dicta of judges
and statements of authors, entitled to great respect, which show
that from the earliest times it has been considered as the settled
law, that the relation of parent and child was within the exception.
See the remarks of Lord COKE in Baylie v. Clare, 2 Brownl. 275,
276; s. c. 1 Rolle Abr. 687, pt. 4-6; and of Lord BACON in Bac.
Max. reg. 18. The same rule is explicitly laid down without question by the author of Bacon's Abridgment, and by Mr. Dane, and
by Mr. Justice MCLEAN: Bacon Abr. Duress, B.; Dane Abr.
166, 375; NeClintlek v. Cummins, 3 McLean 158, 159. See,
MORTON,
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Wayne v.
also, the remarks of 'WYLDE, J., and of TWISDEN, J., in
Sands, 1 Freem. 351.

This case is too imperfectly reported to be

J., would
of great weight, and the remarks attributed to TWISDEN,

exclude the case of husband and wife in opposition to all the
authorities; see the same case under the name Warn v. Sandown,
3 Keb. 238. We are not referred to any modern authorities
opposed to the views of the learned judges and authors whom we
have cited. The exception in favor of husband and wife, is not
based solely upon the legal fiction that they are in law one person,
but rather upon the nearness and tenderness of the relation. The
substantial reasons of the exception, apply as strongly to the case
of a parent and child, as to that of a husband and wife. No more
a
powerful and constraining force can be brought to bear upon
than
obligation,
an
him
man, to overcome his will, and extort from
the
threats of great injury to his child. Both upon reason and
may
weight of the authorities, we are of opinion, that a parent
avoid his obligation by duress to his child, and therefore, that the
ruling of the court below on this point was correct. The plaintiff
contends, that the defence of duress was not open under the pleadings. Where the plaintiff declares upon an executory contract, if
the defendant relies upon duress he must specify it in his answer:
Gen. Stats. c. 129, sects. 17-27. But this is a suit under Gen.
do
Stats. c. 137, and the provisions of the practice act above cited
Allen
4
Co.,
not apply to it: Taylor v. New -EnglandCoal Mining
577. Any evidence which goes to show that the deed under which
the plaintiff claims the right of possession is invalid, is admissible
under the general issue, as it sustains the defendant's denial of the
plaintiff's allegations.
The evidence of duress, and also the evidence that the female
defendant held the premises under a deed prior to that of the plaintiff, was properly admitted.
Exceptions overruled.
The question as to what amounts to
duress per minas at law will be found
learnedly considered by 'Mr. W. H.
Phillips in 14 Am. Law Reg., (N. S.)
201, who, after a review of the old and
modern Roman law rules, as well as the
leading English and American cases
upon the subject, submits the following
eminently reasonable propositions:
VOL. XXIX.- 84

1. " That any unlawful threatsamount
to duress per minas, sufficient to avoid a
contract or agreement, if such contract
or agreement would not have been entered into if the threats had not been
used."
2. "That the question whether a contract or agreement was entered into
through fear, is a question of fact for
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the jury to decide in each individual
case; and that therefore it would be
erroneous for a judge to charge, as a
pri'icipleof law, that the duress, in order
to avoid the obligation, must have been
such as was calculated to overcome the
will of a man of ordinary firmness of'
mind." See, also, the note to Wright
v. Remington, 18 Am. Law. Reg., (N.
S.) 748.
The question who may avail himself
of duress is sometimes quite as important
as whether duress has been exercised;
and the general rule unquestionably is
that no stranger can take advantage of
the duress, which is a personal defence:
Huscombe v. Standing, Cro. Jac. 187 ;
a. c.Ewell's Leading Cases 787 ; Bac.
Abr. Duress, B; Mantall v. Ifoollington,
Roll.'LAbr. 687, pl. 7 ; Wayne v. Sands,
Freem. 351; Roll. Abr. 686, pl. 6;
.Mfantell v. Gibbs, 1 Brownl. 64; Plum358 ; Spaulding v.
mer v. People, 16 Ill.
Crawford, 27 Tex. 155; Robinson v.
Gould, 11 Cush. 57 ; Jones v. Turner, 5
Litt. 147. See, also, McClintick v.
Cummins, 3 McLean 158; 2 Greenl. Ev.
sect. 302; Thompson v. Lockwood, 15
John. 256. Thus, inHuscombev. Standwig, supra, it was held that if a bond be
obtained from A. and B. by duress
against A. only, B. cannot plead the
duress against A. in discharge of the
bond. A distinction has, however, been
taken between common-law and statutory
bonds. Thus in Thompson v. Lockwood,
supra, where a joint and several bond
was taken by a sheriff from a defendant
whom he had no right to detain in custody, it was held that the co-obligee, or
surety, might avail himself of the defence of duress in a several action
See, also, Hawes v.
against him.
Marchant, I Curt. 143. In the following cases, also, viz., Governor v. Williams, Dudley 244; State v. Brantley,
27 Ala. 44; -isher v. S7attuck, 17 Pick.
252; Jones v. Turner, 5 Litt. 147, the
defence of duress of the principal was
allowed to be made by the sureties on

statutory bonds. In Strong v. Grannis,
26 Barb. 122, on the authority of
Thompson r. Lockwood, supra, Ingersoll
v. Roe, 65 Barb. 346, and Erans v.
Huey, 1 Bay 13, the surety on a promissory note was allowed to avail himself
of the duress of his principal ; and in
PHummer v. The People, 16 Ill. 358, and
Huggins v. The People, 39 Ill. 246,
duress of principal was held not to be a
good plea by the surety on a recognisance. The distinction above stated was
not referred to by the court in either of
these cases.
. There are several other exceptions to
the rule stated above.
A husband may avoid his contract by
reason of duress to his wife and conversely: Bayley v. Clare, 2 Brownl.
276; Baa. Abr. Duress, B; Plummer
v. People, 16 Ill. 36o'; Brooks v. Berryhill, 20 Ind. 97 ; Eadie v. Slimmon, 26
N. Y. 9; Green v. Scranage, 19 Iowa
461. See also, Gohegan v. Leach, 24
Iowa 509. In J1-right v. Remington, 18
Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 743, however,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that a threat made by a husband through
procurement of one of the payees of a
note executed, by the husband, that,
unless his wife signed such note, he
would poison himself, which threat was
made to induce, and did induce, her to
sign, did not amount to duress, and was
in law no defence to an action against
her upon such note. See the said case
criticised in the note thereto, p. 750.
It seems well settled, also, in accordance with the doctrine of the principal
case, that a son may avoid his contract
by reason of duress to his father, and the
father by reason of duress to his son:
Bac. Abr. Duress, B ; Roll. Abr. 687 ;
Bayley v. Clare, 2 Brownl. 276 ; W1'ayne
v. Sands, Freem. 351, per WvsLDE, J.;
Southern Express Co. v. Duffey, 48 Geo.
358, 361; Jctintick v. Cummins, 3
McLean, 158: Plummer v. People, 16
111.36n ; Osborn v. Rubbins, 36 N. Y.
365. But see, contra, Sinaons v. Bare.
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foot, 2 HIayw. 402; 1 Story on Cont.
519, and note 9. See,
(5th ed.),
also, Fulton v. Hood. 34 Penn. St. 371.

Roll. Abr. 687 ; 2 Brownl. 276; Baa.
Abr., Duress, B.
A bill of sale cannot be impeached by

The mayor and commonalty may avoid
a deed by reason of a duress ofthe mayor:
Bayley v. Clare, 2 Browul. 276; 9 Vin.

the seller's creditors, nor by an officer
attaching in their behalf, on the ground
-of duress : Lewis v. Bannister, .6 Gray

Abr. 320, Duress, B, pl. 27.
A servant cannot avoid a deed made

500.

by duress to his master, nor conversely:

MRSHALL D. ENELL.

Chicago.

Supreme Court of illinois.
CHARLES P. STILLMAN v. FANNIE H. STILLMAN.
Where a wife i's divorced a vinculo, and marries another man, who is able to
afford her a reasonable support, suitable and corresponding with the position of the
parties in society, she thereby elects to abandon her claim for future alimony on her
first husband. The decree will not, however, be made retroactive, so as to cut off

alimony that has previously accrued.
APPEAL from the Appellate Court, First District. The facts
were as follows:
In July 1877, Fannie H. Stillman obtained a divorce from her
husband, Charles P. Stillman, on bill filed in the Circuit Court of
Cook county, where the parties resided. The decree rendered
made it obligatory on defendant to pay complainant $60 per month
as alimony. That sum was regularly paid to complainant, up to
the first day of February 1880.
On the 14th day of January 1880, complainant married Frank
Eldredge, with whom she has ever since lived as his wife.
At the March Term 1880, of the Circuit Court in which the
divorce proceedings were had, defendant appeared and entered a
motion to amend the decree so as to exempt him from further payment of alimony, or to decrease the amount fixed by the decree.
An affidavit of defendant set forth as the grounds of the motion,
1. A material decrease in the amount of his income since the rendering of the decree, and financial embarrassment occasioned by
encumbrances upon his property, and 2. The subsequent marriage
of complainant.
Complainant resisted the motion, and filed her own affidavit, in
which she stated, 1. Facts tending to show the financial ability of
defendant to continue to pay the alimony awarded her by the original decree, and 2. That the income of her present husband, after
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discharging other obligations resting upon him, is insufficient to
afford her an adequate support.
On the hearing of the motion, the court made an order modifying the original decree in such manner as to absolve defendant
from further payment of the alimony ordered by the original
decree, and in lieu thereof it was decreed defendant from that date
should pay complainant one dollar annually, to be paid at the end
of each year. A counsel fee was allowed complainant to resist the
motion to reduce her alimony.
An appeal was taken by complainant from that decree to the
Appellate Court of the First District. The errors assigned called
in question the correctness of the judgment of the Circuit Court
in amending the original decree in respect to the alimony allowed,
and in reducing it to a nominal sum. Cross-errors were assigned,
1. As to the allowance of a solicitor's fee to the party resisting the
motion, and 2. In not making such decree retroactive so as to
suspend the payment of alimony after the first day of February
1880," on account of the previous marriage of complainant.
The Appellate Court reversed so much of the order of the Circuit Court as absolved defendant thereafter from paying alimony as
required by the original decree, and giving complainant in lieu
thereof one dollar a year, but in other respects affirmed the order
or decree of the Circuit Court.
An appeal was granted to defendant on a single question, viz.:
Whether the subsequent marriage of complainant ipsofacto entitled
defendant to have the alimony provided in the original decree
reduced to a nominal sum, complainant's husband being unable to
provide her with a suitable support, and defendant being able to
pay the amount fixed in the original decree, the court being of
opinion such question is involved in this case, and is of such
importance on account of principle and collateral interest that it
should be passed upon by the Supreme Court.

A. T. Galt, for appellant.
osepht Wfright, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCOTT, J.-The Appellate Court,* by its judgment, assumed to
find certain facts: 1. That defendant is the owner of a large estate
* The decision of the Appellate Court is reported in 7 Bradwell 524.

STILLMAN v. STILLMAN.

669

derived from his father, who is deceased, and has means out of
which he might comply with the original decree as to alimony;
and 2. That since the rendering of the original decree, complainant, on January 14th 1880, married a man by the name of
Eldredge, who works upon a salary of seventy-five dollars per
month, out of which he has to support an aged mother, and that
he is unable to support complainant.
It will be observed, this is not a case where the findings of facts
by the Appellate Court, although embodied in and made a part of
its judgment, is conclusive on the Supreme Court. The Practice
Act has not so provided. In all chancery cases, this court may
look into the record and ascertain what facts are established by the
evidence. The rule as to the practice in such cases has been settled by repeated decisions of this court. On looking into the
record it is seen the testimony concerning disputed facts is contained in ex parte affidavits-a most unsatisfactory mode of eliciting the truth as to any question of fact. It is shown defendant's
income is now much less than when the alimony was fixed by the
original decree, and that his property is so heavily encumbered as
to cause great financial embarrassment.
It is admitted the income of complainant's husband is seventyfive dollars per month, but it is not proved that sum is not sufficient
to enable him to afford her a suitable support, considering the
social position she occupies. It certainly- cannot be declared as a
fact generally known that it is not. It may therefore be assumed
for the purposes of the decision of the question involved, as the
same is certified to this court, that defendant is able to pay the
alimony provided in the original decree, and that complainant's
husband is able to afford her a reasonable support every way suitable and corresponding with the position the parties occupy in
social life.
The question presented has not before arisen in this state, and
the cdurt is left free to determine it as one of first impression, by
the aid of such decision as may have been given to it by other
courts whose judgments are entitled to respect. The jurisdiction
of the court to grant the relief sought, is expressly conferred by
statute, which provides the court in which any divorce is decreed
may make such order touching alimony and maintenance of the
wife, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of
the case shall be fit, reasonable and just, and may on application
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from time to time make such alterations in the allowance of alimon.
and maintenance as shall appear reasonable and proper.
Although our statute vests courts granting divorces with large
discretion in respect to the allowance of alimony, and in the
making of such alterations concerning the same as shall appear
to be reasonable and proper, it is understood to be a judicial discretion, subject to review in an appellate court, so that there may
be no abuse of that discretion with which courts are clothed in
such matters, and to the end that justice may be done.
The Circuit Court was of opinion the subsequent marriage of
complainant so changed the relations of the parties as to make it
reasonable and proper to reduce the alimony granted by the original decree to a nominal sum, and so decreed. That decision finds
sanction in considerations that affect vitally the best interests of
society and conserve a sound public policy.
Alimony is that allowance which is made to a woman on a decree
of divorce, for her support, out of the estate of her husband. At
common law it was usually settled at the discretion of the ecclesiastical judge, on consideration of all the circumstances of the
case.
The practice in our courts follows closely the practice in the
English courts in that respect. Underlying all rules of practice
to which long usage has given the consistence of law, may be found.
some reason that satisfies the common judgment of their justness.
Accordingly, it is found the principle on which alimony is given
to the divorced wife is, it is the equivalent of that obligation
implied in every marriage contract, the husband shall furnish his
wife what shall be deemed a suitable support, corresponding in
degree with his pecuniary ability and social standing, and from
any further performance of his marital obligation in that regard,
he is absolved by the decree of divorce. Our statute is silent as
to when and for what cause the husband may be relieved from
further payment of alimony imposed by the decree. In the
absence of legislation, the question remains for the decision of
the courts. 'Of course, the decease of the beneficiary operates to
suspend all further payment of alimony.
It is for the obvious reason it is no longer necessary for her
support, the personal representatives were never permitted to
recover any portion of the sum decreed, except such sum or instalment thereof as had become payable in her lifetime, and which
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remained unpaid at her death. Reasoning from analogy, it would
seem that when, for any cause, the alimony decreed becomes
unnecessary for the support of the wife, or when circumstances
transpire that make it inequitable she should have further allowancc. it would be reasonable and proper for the court to absolve
the husband from the burdens imposed by the decree. This the
court has ample power to do under our statute.
It would be difficult to suggest or conceive any cause that would
present grounds more "reasonable and proper" for suspending
further payment of alimony than the subsequent marriage of the
divorced wife.
The impression made by the doctrine of the common law that
by marriage husband and wife are one person in law, has not been
entirely removed from the mind by modern legislation. The obligation, implied in the marital relation, resting on the husband to
support his wife, remains, having all the binding efficacy it had at
common law.
Courts of equity will be slow to change that obligation in any
case from the husband to another man, although he may once have
been the husband of the wife. Aside from its positive unseemliness, such a policy finds no support in any equitable consideration.
Treating alimony, as may be done, as the equivalent of that
obligation for support which arises in favor of the wife out of the
marriage contract, and which is lost when that contract is annulled
by the decree, she obtains the same obligation for support by a
second marriage. It is unreasonable that she should have the
equivalent of an obligation for support, by way of alimony from a
former husband, and an obligation from a present husband for an
adequate support at the same time.
It is illogical as well as unreasonable. It is her privilege to
abandon the provision the decree of the court made for her support,
under the sanctions of the law, for another provision of maintenance, which she would obtain by a socond marriage; and when she
has done so, the law" will require her to abide by her election.
There is no reason why she should not do so.
Conforming closely with this view of the law, are the following
cases, in which questions analogous with the one involved were
considered: Albee v. Wyman, 10 Gray 222; Bowman v. Wortington, 24 Ark. 522.
Ml the cases referred to as holding doctrines contrary to the
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views here expressed, have been carefully examined. It is not
-perceived that any of them are directly in point, unless it is Shepard v. Shepard, 1 Hun (N. Y.) 241. The reasoning of the court
in that case on the question involved in this decision, is neither
conclusive nor satisfactory.
Forrestv. Forrest,3 Bosw. 661, is upon a question that does not
come within range of this decision. Nor was the effect of a subsequent marriage of the wife upon her alimony discussed, when
the Forrest case was before the Court of Appeals (25 N. Y. 501.)
MI ler v. Clark, 23 Ind. 370, holds, that arrears of alimony
decreed by a court in favor of a divorced wife, under the statutes
of that state, may be collected after her death by her administrator.
Exactly the same question was considered by this court in Dinet
v. Bigermann, 80 Ill. 274, and the same conclusion reached.
Perkins v. Perkins, 12 Mich. 456, holds, that the section of the
statute of that state which provides that after decree for alimony,
the court may, from time to time, on the petition of either party,
revise and alter such decree, must be construed as only authorizing
the change on new facts thereafter transpiring, which are of such
a character as to make the change necessary to suit such new state
of facts; and in so far as that case can have any possible application to the case in hand, it is fully indorsed.
It is said, the policy of the law favors rather than restrains
marriage; and the suggestion of counsel is, if the subsequent marriage of the wife shall be held to suspend the further payment of
alimony by the former husband, it is in restraint of marriage,
which is forbidden. It is not perceived there is any force in the
argument on this branch of the case.
Pension laws, suspending further payments to widows, on account
of subsequent marriage, have existed many years, and no suggestion was ever made that they operated in restraint of marriage.
Nor is it understood how such laws could have any such effect.
Pensions are no doubt granted under the belief they furnish in some
degree at least, that support which it is supposed the husband
would have rendered to the wife if living, and which is lost to her
by his death.
On her subsequent marriage, she simply abandons the provision
which the law humanely made for her for a support, which she has
a right to expect she will receive from her second husband. That
is precisely the case as to alimony. The divorced wife abandons
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the provision made for her support out of the estate of her former
husband,. by the decree of the court, for that adequate support
which she contracts for by the subsequent marriage. It is a matter
that affects her own happiness, and about which she is perfectly
free and competent to make a choice. Whether she acts wisely in
her election, or whether in every instance she obtains as good or as
adequate support by her marriage, as that which she abandoned,
are questions about which courts can have no concern. It is a
matter of her own voluntary election.
There was no error in the Circu't Court in refusing to make its
decree retroactive, so as to cut off alimony that had previously
accrued. As respects the allowance of counsel fees to complainant, in resisting the motion for the reduction of her alimony, the
court acted within powers conferred by the statute, and the fees
allowed are not unreasonably high.
The judgment of the Appellate Court will be reversed, and the
cause remanded with directions to that court to affirm the decree
of the Circuit Court in all things.
The question discussed in the principal
case is, as stated b. the court, anew one
in the state of Illinois, and has, notwithstanding its practical importance,
received very little discussion by the
courts of other states.
The original English divorce act (20
& 21 Vict. c. 85,
32) provides that
"the court may, if it shall think fit, on
any such decree [of divorce a rinculo],
order that the husband shall, to the satisfaction of the court, secure to the wife
such gross sum of money, or such annual
sum of money for any term not exceeding
her own life, as having regard to her fortune (if any), to the ability of the husband, and to the conduct of the parties,
it shall deem reasonable," &c.
This
provision may, in the discretion of the
court, be given in the form of alimony,
and in the decree allowing it, there appears always to be inserted a provision
that it shall continue only dum sola et
casta vixerit. See 2 Bish. far. & Div.
477 b ; Fisher v. lRsher, 2 Swab. &
,Tr. 410, 414; Gladstone v. Gladstone,
I P. & D. 442, 446 ; ]hetwynd v. ChetVOL. XXIX.-85

wynd, L. R., 1 P. & D. 39; Sidney v.
Sidney, 4 Swab. & Tr. 178. In Fisher
v. Fisher, supra., Sir C. CRESSWELL,

Judge Ordinary, with reference to this
subject said: "Again, if she avails herself of the freedom conferred- by the decree of this court, and marries again,
it would be unreasonable to compel
the former husband to maintain her."
Again, with reference to this subject,
HANNEN, President, in Gladstone v.
Gladstone, supra., said : "I think it perfeetly reasonable in these cases where the
husband is called upon to sacrifice a portion of his own means that the conditions
dum sola et casta vixerit should be imposed, but I am of opinion that when the
effect of the order is only to deprive the
husband of his interest in the wife's fortune, and to put the innocent wife into
immediate possession of her own income,
no such condition ought to be imposed."
In the United States a diversity of
opinion prevails upon the subject. In
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 1 Hun 240 ; s. c.
3 Thomp. & C. 715, where the alimony
allowed the wife was $3000 per year,
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act." Forres! v. Forrest, 25 N. Y. 501,
and her second husband had an income 514-16, affirming s. c. 3 Bosw. 661, is
of $2500 a year, and where the wife cited by the court in the opinion above
derived an income of $672.50, by reason quoted from. In New York, however,
of a marriage prior to that with the de- under the statute the adjustment of alifendant, it was directly held that her mony is regarded as final, so that the dealimony was not affected by the last mar- cree cannot be changed in this respect
riage, and should not be reduced on that after the court finally adjourns for the
account. The proofs in this case, says term. See Kamp v. Kamp, 59 N. Y.
the court, showed that the wife was 212; Kerr v. Kerr, 59 How. Pr.
dependent upon the provision made for 255; Park v. Park, 18 Hun 466; 2
her support by the decree, and that it Bish. Mar. & Div.
433 a, 478. The
was not claimed that any change had oc- case of Shepherd v. Shepherd, may, therecurred in the circumstances of the hus- fore, properly be considered as not of
band rendering him unable to supply it. controlling authority upon the question
In rendering the opinion of the court, under consideration in the principal case.
DANIELS, J., said: "The statute emIn Albee v. Wyman, 10 Gray 222, repowers the court, upon making a decree ferred to by the court in the principal
in favor of the wife, dissolving the mar- case, by articles of separation a husband
riage for the misconduct of the husband, covenanted, in consideration of his wife's
to require him to provide such suitable withdrawing a libel for a divorce, to pay
allowance for her support as it shall deem her a certain sum annually during her
just, having regard to the circumstances
life. The wife afterwards, by another
,if the respective parties. And the con- similar libel, obtained a decree for a
'snuance of that allowance is in no way divorce a vinculo, and for alimony, which
rendered dependent on the fact that she by agreement was fixed at the sum payshall not afterwards marry again. It is
able under the articles. The wife, after
liable to no such contingency [3 R. S.,
receiving two instalments of such ali5th ed., 236, 58.] Beyond that the mony, married another man, whereupon
statute expressly secures to the wife the
the alimony was reduced by the court to
right to marry again when she is the ina nominal sum; and it was held that the
nocent party to the decree, and it neither
covenant, if ever valid, was discharged
expressly, nor by any reasonable impliby the decree for alimony, it having
tation, deprives her of her allowance by
been accepted in lieu of such covenant,
way of alimony for so doing [Id. 237,
and that, upon the subsequent reduction
62.] Complete control is given the of the alimony by the court, the covenant
court over the subject of the amount, could not be made the basis of a rebut that is in no sense rendered depend- covery. The question involved in the
ent upon the circumstances of her subse- * principal case does not seem to have
quent marriage, and as long as that is been litigated in this case, but the prothe nature of the provision made upon priety of the order reducing the alimony
this subject, the court is not authorized seems to have been assumed, and its disto add a further qualification, for which cussion to have been incidental only and
no warrant has been supplied by law. not necessary to the decision of the
The remedy is entirely statutory in its cause.
nature, and must be governed by the hn.e
In Bowman v. Worthinton, 24 Ark.
port and spirit of the legislation upon th,d 522, the wife, after the divorce, remarsubject, and, as it has not been provide y ried, and was left a widow by the death
that the wife shall forfeit her alimony b, o of her second husband, and the court,
afterwards remarrying, the court has nie on the authority of Albee v. Wyman,
right to attach that as a penalty to th
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supra, were of opinion that she had no

to a man unable to support her, sufficient

right to alimony or support from the first
husband, either during the life of the
second husband or after his death. The
application for alimony was made in this
case bv a bill filed solely for that purpose after the death of the second hus-

to justify a court of equity, acting upon
the principles of natural justice, to thus
interfere in favor of a party so culpable,
anl against one otherwise so entirely
blameless?"
In solving this question,
the learned julge observed that "as a
consequence of such wrong on his [the
lmshand's] part, an obligation arose
which has its foundation in natural
equity, is recognised by positive law,
and bound him to furnish maintenance
for her, to be measured by her wants
and his circumstances and ability, and
to continue during their joint lives,
unless she acquired other means of support ;" and then stated what he regarded
as the true rule, viz. : " That while the
remarriage of the wife might be prima
facie or presumptive evidence that she
had acquired other means of support,
yet it is not conclusive ; and when it is
made to appear that actually she had not,
then such marriage affords no ground
for relieving the former delinquent husband from the alimony provided in the
decree, or for reducing it to a mere
nominal sum."
It will be seen that the
rule of decision of the principal case
adopted by the Appellate Court is not
inconsistent with that adopted by the
Supreme Court, where the complainant's
husband was regarded as able to afford
her a reasonable support ; neither is it as
it seems, inconsistent in this respect with
Sheplerd v. Shepherd, supra; for in that
case also the court says that the wife
was dependent upon the provision made
for her support by the decree. Although
in a case like the principal case, the
guilty husband is entitled to no sympathy
and the innocent wife to the entire sympathy of the court, still
upon the facts as
found by the court, the decision seems
correct, and supplemented by the decision
of the Appellate Court, forms a valuable
contribution to the law.upon an important and interesting subject.
T
Mf&RSHALL D. EwE ..

band.

Where the statute does not allow any
change of the decree after the court
finally adjourns for the term, the remarriage of the wife can of course have
no ettlct upon her right to alimony
under the decree. If, however, we
accept the definition of alimony given
by the court in the principal case as
being "that allowance which is made
to a woman on a decree of divorce for
her support out of the estate of her husband," which appears to be correct (see
2 BiA. Mar. and Div., sect. 351) ; and
if, as it is said, it is measured by the
wants of the person entitled to it, and
the circumstances or ability of him who
is bound to furnish it (see Vhieeler v.
Vhler, 18 Ill. 39 ; Foote v. Foote, 22
Ill.
425), then, where, as in Illinois, the
court may, after the rendition of the
decree, from time to time, make such
alterations in the allowance of alimony
and maintenance as shall appear reasonahle and proper, the decision of the
court in the principal case would seem
to be in accordance with the weight of
authority and not unreasonable in itself.
It is to be observed, however, that the
case in the Supreme Court was decided
upon a different state of facts from that
assumed as the basis of decision by the
Appellate Court of the First District, and
the rule of decision laid down by the
learned judge who delivered the opinion
reported in 7 Bradwell 524, may still
be regarded as having great weight
should the question there decided again
arise. The question to be decided was
thus stated by MCALLISTER, P. J., in
the Appellate Court: "Is the mere fact
that plaintiff, two years and a half after
the decree of divorce, married again, but
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
EVANSVILLE GAS LIGHT COMPANY v. STATE OF INDIANA Ex
REL. AUDITOR OF

VANDERBURG COUNTY

AND

FRANCIS J.

REITZ.
The foreclosure of a mortgage merges the cause of action in the judgment, but
not the mortgage-lien.
The mortgage-lien is a specific one, while the judgment-lien is a general one,
therefore the former is the superior lien.
The theory of merger is, that the greater estate or thing takes into itself the less,
and this cannot be so where the one alleged to be the inferior is really the superior
Mergers are not favored where they will work an injustice.
Where the mortgagor has made several conveyances to different persons, afid one
of the tracts so conveyed has been freed from the mortgage-lien, it will not be decreed
upon foreclosure, that the remaining tracts be sold in the inverse order of the dates
of the conveyances.

THE State, by the auditor of Yanderburg county, as relator,
prosecuted this suit against the appellant and Francis J. Reitz,
and obtained judgment against the former, but not against the
latter.
A special finding of facts was made by the court at the request
of parties, which was as follows:
"1. That the decree of foreclosure and order of sale set out in
the complaint, whereby it was, on May 12th 1862, adjudged that
there was due from said James G. Jones, to the state of Indiana,
the sum of $457, upon the mortgages mentioned in said decree, is
still in full force and wholly unsatisfied.
"2. That said James G. Jones departed this life on or about the
15th day of April 1872.
"3. That no execution has been issued upon said decree since
one issued May 17th 1862, which was returned on the 4th day of
June 1862, no replevin bail having been entered.
"4. That the lot 23, block 171, on the 7th day of December
1871, was conveyed to the defendant, F. J. Reitz, by said James
G. Jones and Rosanna his wife.
"5. That on the 3d day of November 1865, said Jones and
wife conveyed said lot 39, in block 129, Lamasco City, to said
defendant, the Evansville Gas Light Company.
" 6. That said Jones had no title in said lot 12, block 135,
when the same was conveyed by him to the plaintiff.
"7. That said decree of foreclosure was rendered upon two
several mortgages, one dated April 14th 1855, upon said lot 23,
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block 171, and the other dated the 5th day of August 1859, upon
said lot No. 29, block 129, both to secure the same sum.
"8. That the other defendants, besides the gas company and
said Reitz, have no interest in the property mentioned in the complaint (lots 23 and 29)."
Upon these facts conclusions of law were stated as follows:
"1. That the plaintiff is entitled to have execution for the satisfaction of said decree, together with interest thereon, from the
rendition thereof, and the costs thereon taxed to be satisfied only
by the sale of said lot 29, block 129.
"2. That as to the issue between the said defendant gas company and said Reitz, the equity is in favor of said Reitz, and
the court finds for said Reitz, and that upon said issue he is entitled
to recover his costs.
"3. That as to the issue between the said defendant, Reitz, and
plaintiff, the court finds in favor of said Reitz.
"4. That said mortgage upon said lot 23, block 171, having
been executed more than twenty years, said decree, as to said lot,
is barred and cannot be enforced.
"5. That as to all the other defendants, excepting said gas
company and F. J. Reitz, said complaint ought to be dismissed."
Asa & J. -. Inglehart,for appellant.
Garvin & Palmer and W.

. Smith, for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-The decree of foreclosure which this proceeding
sought to revive, was, as appears from the special finding, rendered
on the 12th day of May 1862, and this action was not instituted
until the 10th day of November 1877, more than sixteen years
afterwards. The appellant insists, that the lien of the decree
ceased at the expiration of ten years from the date of its rendition.
The argument is, that the mortgage wa, merged in the judgment,
and that as the statute limits the lien of a judgment to a period
of ten years from its date, with the expiration of that period terminated the lien of the decree sought to be revived.
Appellant's chief reliance is upon section 527 of the code, which
provides, inter alia, that "all final judgments for the recovery of
money or costs, shall be a lien upon real estate for ten years after
the rendition thereof, and no longer:" 2 R. S. 233. The statute
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in terms applies only to judgments for the recovery of money, and
does not apply to a decree of foreclosure establishing a specific
mortgage-lien upon real- estate; and we do not think it should,
by construction, be so extended as to apply to such decree of foreclosure. Section 642 of the code is also relied upon by the appellant. If the appellant is correct in asserting, that the judgment
merges both the lien of the mortgage and the cause of action
evidenced by it, and that the lien of the judgment takes the place
of that of the mortgage, then under the provisions of either statute,
he is entitled to a reversal.
If the decree of foreclosure which the state obtained against
Jones and wife, is to be treated as an ordinary judgment, then it
must be held that the lien was lost long before this action was
instituted. The controlling question, therefore, is whether a decree
of foreclosure is to be treated as an ordinary judgment, for if it is
to be so regarded, then appellant is clearly right.
If the judgment merged the mortgage-lien, then the mortgagelien was extinguished. It will not do to assume, as a matter of
course, that there was a merger, for there are many cases in which
in order to prevent injustice, courts will not allow merger to take
merger
place, although all the essential elements of a technical
As
favored.
notare
Mergers
case.
particular
the
in
combine
Pick.
3
Crehove,
v.
Gibson
in
said
tersely
SHAW
Chief Justice
482, "mergers are odious in equity."
Nor is it clear that where a mortgage is foreclosed the decree
"swallows" the lien of the mortgage. There are at least two
very strong reasons why this cannot on principle be so: 1st. The
mortgage-lien is a specific one, the judgment a general one, and
the lien of the former is, therefore, the superior one. The differ--ence between mortgage and judgment-liens is clearly drawn by
WORDEN, J., in Gimbel v. Stolte, 59 Ind. 446. 2d. The lien of
the mortgage is superior in duration to that of the judgment. In
these two essential particulars the mortgage-hen is the greater, and
it would seem almost a contradiction of terms to declare that the
inferior lien can swallow the greater. The whole theory of merger
is that the greater estate or thing takes into itself the less, and
this cannot be so where there are essential particulars in which the
one alleged to be the inferior is really the superior. It can hardly
be possible that even an imaginary legal entity can be conceived
as capable of absorbing into itself another thing greater in two
very essential and prominent features.
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The merger of a judgment takes up the mortgage as a cause of
action but not as a lien. There is a broad distinction between a
merger of a cause of action and the merger of a lien. It is owing
to errors in confusing the merger of a cause of action with the
merger of a lien, that some of the courts have been led into the
erroneous holding that a judgment extinguishes the mortgagelien.
A suit of foreclosure is a remedy for the enforcement of a mortgage-lien, and it ought not to be abridged by holding that the
decree cuts down rather than enlarges the lien. Without a decree
a lien continues for twenty years, and surely that which is meant
to carry into effect this lien ought not to be allowed to have the
effect of shortening the duration of the lien to a period one-half
shorter than that for which it would continue without decree. Upon
principle it is, in our opinion, very clear that, although the judgment merges the mortgage as a cause of action, it does not abridge
or extinguish its lien.
Although there is some conflict in the authorities, we think the
weight is with the doctrine that the decree of foreclosure does not
merge the lien of the mortgage. Counsel refer us to Freeman on
Judgments, sections 215 and 216, but we think these sections
afford appellant's theory no support. The author is speaking of
the effect of a judgment upon the mortgage as a cause of action,
not of its effect upon the lien created by the mortgage. There
cannot well be two opinions upon the proposition that the mortgage
as a cause of action is merged in the decree, and that all rights
growing out of it as a right of action are merged in the judgment
or decree. This, however, is not the point here in debate. In
People v. Beebee, 1 Barb. 879, it was held that the lien of the
mortgage was merged in the decree, and this doctrine is stated approvingly in Gage v. Brewter, 81 N. Y. 296. These are the
only cases to which appellant has referred, and we have found no
other supporting the doctrine they declare.
There are many well-considered cases holding a different doctrine
from that declared by those upon which appellant relies. In our
own reports we have the case of Lapping v. Duffy, 47 Ind. 51,
where it was held that a judgment did not extinguish the lien of
the mortgage. It is true the case just cited did not pass upon the
question as here presented, but the principle enunciated is substantially the same as that which must govern the case under examina-
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tion. We have also the case of Teal v. Hinchr an, 69 Ind. 385,
where the same general doctrine is declared and enforced. In the
case of Hembold v. Man, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 410, the question was
considered and decided adversely to the doctrine of the New York
cases. It was there said: "The lien was created by the mortgage
itself; the judgment neither added to nor took anything from it,
and it is clear that, therefore, the Acts of Assembly, which require
judgments creating liens, or binding lands or real estate, to be
revived every five years for the purpose of continuing such liens,
do not extend to or embrace the liens of mortgages, and can have
The rule that the
no application or bearing upon them whatever."
mortgage-lien is not embraced in the decree is asserted by the
Supreme Court of Iowa in two well-considered cases: Stahd v.
Boost, 34 Iowa 475; Hendershottv. Ping, 24 Id. 134. The same
rule has long since been the settled law of Missouri: .Riley v. McCord, 21 Mo. 285. Illinois has adopted and enforced a like doctrine: Priest v. Wheelock, 58 Ill. 114.
The rule that the lien of the mortgage is not absorbed by the
decree or judgment, is in harmony with settled rules, while the
opposite doctrine is in direct conflict with them. It is a rule of
frequent application, and upon which there is no contrariety of
judicial opinion, that a mortgage-lien is only extinguished by payment or release, and with this rule the doctrine that the decree
does not merge the lien of the mortgage, fully harmonizes, while
the opposite rule is in direct and irreconcilable hostility to it. We
have already adverted to the well-known rule that, as the lien of the
mortgage is specific, while that of the judgment is general, the former is the superior. The doctrine, for which appellant contends,
that the lien of the judgment supplants that of the mortgage, cannot
be brought into harmony with the general rule just stated. There
is a sharp and full conflict. But we deem it unnecessary to multiply illustration. It is obvious that appellant's theory jars and
conflicts with many settled principles, while the opposite theory
agrees and harmonizes with all the great rules of law, except the
technical one of merger; a doctrine neither important in its practical results, nor well supported by either reason or authority.
Counsel insist the court erred in finding in favor of Francis J.
Reitz upon the issue joined between him and appellant. The
position of the appellant is, that as Reitz did not acquire title
until six years after the acquisition of title by the appellant, his
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lot ought to have been ordered to be first sold before resorting to
that purchased by the appellant. It is true, as counsel assert,
that where the original mortgagor has made several conveyances to
different persons, the court will, upon foreclosure, decree that the
parcels shall be sold in the inverse order of the dates of the conveyances, but this rule does not meet the question here presented.
The rule applies where the mortgage is a lien resting alike upon
the whole of the land, but it cannot apply where the mortgage is
not a lien upon one of the parcels. The mortgage which covered
the lot of Reitz was executed more than twenty years prior to the
institution of the appellee's proceedings, and was, therefore, fully
barred by the Statute of Limitations; the rule upon which appellant insists was not intended to impair the rights of the mortgagee,
and is never permitted to have that effect. The rule enforces the
equity maxim that "equities prevail in the order of time," by
adjusting the burden of the mortgage indebtedness in the order
of purchase.
It is insisted that as there was no pleading of Reitz setting up
the Statute of Limitations, the court did wrong in finding in his
favor upon the issue made upon appellant's cross-complaint. We
do not think the point urged can avail the appellant. The case
was not one in which such a pleading was proper, and there was,
therefore, no substantial error in holding against appellant:
Plough v. Beeve8, 33 Ind. 181. The question as to whether there
was any lien to revive was directly and necessarily presented by
the pleading of the State; its decision was inseparably connected
with the determination of the issue, and in determining the issue
the question of the existence of a lien on Reitz's lot was necessarily adjudicated.
It was impossible to determine the issue without settling the
question of the existence or non-existence of a lien upon the lot
of Reitz. There was, therefore, no available error committed in
holding that appellant had no right to relief against Reitz. If
Reitz's lot was entirely free from the burden of the mortgage-lien,
which the State sought to revive, then surely the appellant could
have no right to ask that Reitz's lot be made subject to an extinguished lien.
Judgment affirmed.
An important distinction is made in
this case, namely, that a judgment
rendered for the foreclosure of a mortgage "takes up the mortgage as a cause
VOL. XXIX.-86

of action, but not as a lien." That is,
that the cause of action "is drowned in
the judgment," and is henceforth regarded as functus officio: Biddlesoan .
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Whitel, 1 W. Bla. 507. And it has ing is based, becomes entirely merged
been said that "if a demand of an in- in the judgment. By the judgment of
ferior degree is changed into one of a the court, it loses allits vitality and
higher character, the former is merged ceases to bind the parties to its execuin the latter, upon which the party must tion. Its force and effect are then exalone rely. Thus, is a simple contract pended, and all remaining liability is
transferred to the judgment or decree.
debt merged in a judgment or debt of
record. In that case, a cause of action Once becoming merged in the judgment,
no longer subsists upon the original de- no further action at law or suit in equity
mand. The party has a higher security can be maintained on the instrument.
in the judgment. So, if a bond is given All rights and liabilities originally
for a simple contract debt, the latter is imposed by, or growing out of, the
lost in the former, the specialty being instrument or agreement terminate with
of a higher security :" Wan v. Jlc- the judgment of the court. This being
Nulty, 2 Gilm. 355. But Mr. Freeman so, when the judgment was rendered
has shown that the doctrine of merger on the bond in this case, it ceased
does not always depend upon the fact to be evidence of the debt, and the
that the instrument in which the contract judgment then became the evidence and
or former insirument is merged is of a only evidence that could be used in
higher security. As in the case of a a court of the existence of the original
debt. And that debt could bear only
judgment rendered before a justice of
the peace upon the transcript of a judg- six per cent. interest, whether evidenced
ment previously obtained in a district or by a judgment or a decree. Then, if the
circuit court, either of the United States judgment were the evidence, the decree
or of a state. In such a case there is should have been for the amount oT the
no doubt that the first judgment is of a judgment, with six per cent. interest
higher security than the latter; and yet thereon from the date of its rendition to
no action could be maintained on the the time the decree was rendered." For
former after a judgment had been ob- parallel case, see Cissna v. Haines, 18
Ind. 496. But it has been held that a
tained thereon in the justice's court:
Freeman on Judgments, sect. 215. Mr. verbal promise to pay an existing judgFreeman's reasoning is approved by the ment is not binding, because it is withSupreme Court of Indiana in the case out any consideration ; nor does it extingaish the force of the judgment : Runof Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind. 443.
The doctrine of merger is well illus- namaker v. Cordray, 54 Ill. 303.
It has been said that if a judgment
trated in the case of Wayman v. Cochrane, 35 Ill. 152. There a bond had was rendered upon a specialty in a court
been given that bore ten per cent. inter- not of record, this would not be a bar to
est, secured by mortgage upon real an action on the same in a court of
estate. Judgment was entered upon the record :6 Rep. 44 b,and 45 a, b. But
bond. By statute, all judgments drew this proposition has probably lost its
only sir per cent. interest. This judg- force at the present day.
There is no difference in the merger of
ment not being satisfied, a judgment of
foreclosure of the mortgage was taken, a contract by specialty and a simple con
with ten per cent. interest from the date tract: King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494
of the bond. On appeal, this was held Pitts v. Fugate, 41 Mo. 405; and if the
to be erroneous, the court saying: " The cause of action in two suits be identical,
general rule is, that by a judgment at a judgment recovered in one is a bar to
law or a decree in chancery, the contract the, other, although the forms of action
or instrument upon which the proceed- are different : Butler v. Wright, 2 Wend.
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369; s. c. 6 Wend. 284 ; Stafford v.
Clark, 2 Bing. 377 ; Pitt v. Knigld, I
Sand. 92, and note 2 ; Outranz v. ilorewood, 3 East 346 ; Towns v. Viins, 5
N. 11. 259 : King v. Chase, 15 Id. 9;
Potter v. Baker, 19 Id. 166; Andrews
v. F'arrell, 46 Id. 17 ; and so where an
action is brought upon a judgment and a
new judgment obtained, the old is extinguished : IWhiting v. Beebe, 7 Eng. 549 ;
McVutt v. Wilcox, 3 How. (Miss.)
419 ; so where a levy is made and a delivery bond (which, by statute, has the
force of a judgment when forfeited) is
taken and forfeited, the levy is discharged and the bond so forfeited held
to be a satisfaction of the former judgment: Cooke v. Piles, 2 Miunf. 153;
Lusk v. Ramsay, 3 Id. 433 ; United
States v. Greres, 2 Brock. 385 ; Joyce
v. Farquhar, I A. K. Mar. 20; Justices
v. Lee, 1 B. Mon. 248 ; Young v. Yerger,
298 ; Paris v. Dickson, 1 How. (Miss.)
68" tanders v. M'Dowell, 4 Id. 9 ;
M1nor v. Lancashire,4 Id. 350 ; 1Vanzer
v. Baker, id. 369 ; Bank of U. S. v.
Patton, 5 Id. 200; Barker v. Planters'
Bark, 5 Id. 566 ; Almis v. Smith, 16
Pet. 304 1Frightv. Yell, 13 Ark. 503;
Lipscomyb v. Grace, 26 Id. 234 ; Russell
v. Smtr, 25 Id. 469 ; Black v. Nettle,
Id. 606 ; Connionialth v. Merrigan, 8
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the defendant setting up the recovery
of the second judgment was held bad,

because one judgment cannot determine
another. See also to the same effect,
Murnford v. Stocker, 1 Cow. 178 ; Griswold v. 1ill, 2 Paine C. C. 492; Androws v. Smith, 9 Wend. 53; Phelps v.
John son, 8 Johns. 54 ; Jackson v. Shaler,
11 Id. p. 517; Howard v. Sheldon,
11 Paige 562; Bates v. Lyons, 7
Id. 85 ; Gregory v. Thomas, 20
Wend. 20; Baker v. Mrartin, 3 Barb.
641. Nor callthe defendant object
that suit ought not to be brought on the
last judgment, because the plaintiff will
thereby get compound interest: Coilingwood v. Carson, 2 W. & S. 220 ; Custer
v. Detterer, 3 W. & S. 28.
The second proposition is that the lien
of the mortgage is not merged in the
judgment. The judgment in the case
can be regarded only as a means of enforcing the mortgage-lien. The Statute
of Limitations did not begin to run
against the lien until the debt became
due and could be demanded in a court
by suit. Then the debt may be regarded
as changed in form only, while the lien
is the same.
"As a general rule, the mere change in
the form of the debt does not satisfy a
mortgage given to secure it, unless it is
intended to so operate. The lien of
Bush 132; contra, Patton v. lamner,
the debt attaches to the mortgaged proId.
4
Land,
33 Ala. 307 ; h1opkins v.
perty, and the lien can, as between the
427; Randolph v. Randolph, 3 Rand.
parties, only be destroyed by the payFreeMr.
of
490. But the statement
ment or discharge of the debt, or by a
man given above is contra several adrelease of the mortgage. 'Mere change
Pearson,
v.
Il'eeks
In
judicated ca~cs.
in the form of the evidence of the debt
5 N. H. 324, it was held that one judgin nowise affects the lien. A renewal
as
ment being of as high a nature
of the note, its reduction to a judgment,
another, the latter cannot extinguish the
or other change, not intended to operate
v.
Preston
former; and the case of
as a discharge of the lien, still leaves it,
Perton, Cro. Eliz. 817, is cited. There
as between the parties, in full vigor.
Court
the
in
Preston recovered judgment
This is a rule in equity that is sanctioned
of King's Bench against Perton, and
by many adjudged cases. In that forum
judgment
the
on
afterward brought debt
mere form is disregarded, and the subin the Common Pleas and had judgment
stance only is considered. The cases
in
facias
scire
there. He then brought
of Hamilton v. Quimby, 46 Il1. 91 ; IMaythe King's Bench to have execution on
35 Id. 155 ; Elliott Y.
A plea in bar by man v. Corarane,
the first judgment.
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Blair, 47 Id. 343; and Rogers v. Trustees of Schools, 46 Id. 428, illustrate the
Flower v. Elwood, 66 Ill. 446.
rule."
See Worcester National Bank v. Cheeney, 87 Il. 602; Lippold v. Held, 58
Mo. 213; Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Id.
153.
If the lien is merged in the judgment,
then the mortgagee occupies a dangerous
position, and Anortgages as securities are
much less in value than a personal
security. In the case from Missouri,
cited in the opinion, this is well stated
by Judge SCOTT: "If the lien of the
mortgage is extinguished by the judgment, the mortgagee is in a dangerous
situation, such a one as would induce
many mortgagees to forego the remedy
provided by statute ; for the. mortgagelien, being extinguished by the lien of
the judgment obtained in the suit for a
foreclosure, and the lien of the judgment
taking effect from its rendition, if judgments should have been previously rendered against the mortgagor in favor of
others, though subsequent in date to the
minrtgage, those subsequent creditors
would obtain a preference over a prior
mortgage, though duly recorded :" Riley
v. McCord, 21 Mo. 285; Jordan v.
Smith, 30 Iowa 500.
In Hendershott v. Ping, 24 Iowa 134,
the court says: "But the lien acquired
by the mortgage was the result of the
contract by the parties. The lien of the
mortgage was independent of and prior
to the judgment. It in no manner depended upon the judgment for its existence; the judgment did not merge the
lien of the mortgage, but was simply a
means of effectuating and enforcing that
lien. The judgment did merge the
mortgage-debt, but a merger of the
debt, or any change of the evidence of
it--as by giving a note for the amount
secured by mortgage, by renewal of note,
giving a bond or other thing short of
payment-does not destroy the lien of
the mortgage; that continues until the
debt is paid or discharged :" Peck's Ap-

peal, 31 Conn. 215 ; Morrison v. 11orrison, 38 Iowa 73; Shearer v. Mills, 35
Id. 499 ; Rockwell v. Servant, 63 Il.
424. In the latter case it is said, "Did
the mere recovery of the judgqnent on
the scirefaciasextinguish the relation of
mortgagor and mortgagee ? We think
not. Whilst it may have made some
changes in their respective rights it must
be conceded that the most essential and
important continued. The money was
still due the mortgagee, and he still retained, unimpaired, his lien on the premises, not only subject, but ordered to be
sold for its payment. Neither the note
nor mortgage was satisfied or discharged,
but both remained in full force."
"The judgment obtained in the scire
facias sued out upon the mortgage here.
created no lien whatever upon the land.
The lien was created by the mortgage
itself; the judgment neither added to nor
took anything from it. It is clear, there
fore, that the Acts of Assembly which
require judgments creating liens or binding lands or real estate to be revived
every period of five years, for the purpose of continuing such liens, do not
extend to or embrace liens of mortgages,
and can have no application to or bearing upon them whatever. The lien of
the mortgage, therefore, continued to
exist in the present case as if no scire
facias had been sued out and judgment
The only effect of a
obtained on it.
judgment in such a case is to give the
mortgagee an execution immediately,
if he chooses, against the land mortgaged
and nothing else, that he may levy the
amount of his debt out of it by a sale
thereof:" Helmbold v. Man, 4 Whart.
410.
While it is said in the last case that
the relations of the mortgagee and mortgagor are not changed, which is undoubtedly true, the further statement
that the judgment of foreclosure only
gives an execution to the mortgagor to
enforce payment of his debt, and that no
other change is effected, cannot be strictly
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correct, since no action could be maintained upon the original evidence of the
debt. On the contrary, the validity of
the debt secured is established by the
highest evidence known to the law:
Ho (ord v. iNichols, I Paige 220 ; lAlorris v. Ployd, 5 Barb. 130 ; Clarke v.
Bancroft, 13 Iowa 320. But, of course,
the verdict of a jury, not followed by a
judgment, is not such evidence: Batchelder v. Taylor, 11 N. H. 129. As to
the force of the evidence furnished by a
judgment of foreclosure, a good illustration is offered in the case of Hartman
v. 09born, 54 Penn. St. 120, where it was
held that a judgment on a void mortgage
was binding and could not be disputed.
As intimated in the opinion of the
court, the authorities are conflicting upon
the question of merger, all deciding that
the mortgage debt is merged, but not all
that the mortgage lien is merged. Thus
in Lewis v. Conover, 21 N. J. Eq. 230,
it is said the mortgage is merged in the
judgment of foreclosure, which can only
be construed to mean both the debt and
mortgage lien. So, again, in The People v. Beebe, I Barb. 379, "This mortgage was merged in the decree entered
upon it, which decree was enrolled, but
not docketed. The lien of the mortgage
was thus extinguished and gone. That
a judgment at law extinguishes the debt
upon which it is obtained is too plain a
proposition to require argument or
authority to prove. I am-not able to
see why a decree of a court of equity
should not have the same effect. ** *
The decree was not a lien because itwas
notdocketed." While this is only adictur, it was cited by the Court of Appeals in Gage v. Brewster, 31 N. Y.
226. In this last case the court speak
of only the debt being merged. And so
in Elsworth v. Muldoon, 15 Abb. Pr.
(N. S.) 445, reference is made to a
merger of the debt only, although the
case of People v. Bebee is cited ; but in
Rawiszer v. Hamilton, 51 How. Pr. 299,
it is said the mortgage is merged, citing

the same case.
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This case is cited in

Samon v. Allen, 11 Hun. 32, but upon
a different point.
And in Smith v. Gardner, 42 Barb.
356, it is said, "While the mortgage
alone is in equity a mere lien, it is still
such a lien, .that on a foreclosure it ripens
intoa title, extinguishing that of the mortgagor." So in Bagley v. Ward, 37 Cal.
131, speaking of attachment liens, the
court said, "The purpose of an attachment is, to hold the propefty of the
defendants as security for such judgment
as may be rendered, and when the
judgment is rendered and becomes a
.lien upon the property attached, the lien
of the attachment becomes merged in that
of the judgment; and the only effect
thereafter of the attachment lien upon
the property is, to preserve the priority
thereby acquired, and this priority is
maintained and enforced under the judgment."
The question is not decided in this
case, but the query arises whether the
judgment of foreclosure, at the expiration of the mortgage lien, can extend the
lien of the mortgage; or whether the
two liens can be tacked together. Upon
principle, it would seem, that the judgment being obtained for the purpose of
enforcing the mortgage lien, cannot,
when that lien fails, be used for a purpose entirely foreign to the first object
of the creditor, in commencing his foreIt would seem,
closure proceedings.
that where a subsequent mortgagee had
obtained title to the mortgaged premises
by foreclosure and sale, before the first
mortgagee had foreclosed his mortgage,
he could hold the land against such prior
mortgagee, who had foreclosed his mortgage near the time of the expiration of
his mortgage lien, but had, after that lien
had expired, sold the premises on an
execution issued on his judgment of
foreclosure ; thus claiming benefit of his
prior special lien by means of a judgment which, in theory, is only a.general
lien, and which had been obtained to
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enforce the mortgage lien. In the case
reported, it is said, the purchaser derived
title through and by virtue of the mortgage lien. If in the one case he derives
title by foreclosure of the mortgage lien,
why should he still have the right to derive title through that same lien, when it
was not merged in the judgment of foreclosure, and when it, by statute, if it
had not been foreclosed, would have
ceased to be allien upon the real estate ?
Where the lien of a judgment exists,
a stated period by statute and the judgment is then revived by scirefacias,this
does not extend the lien of the judgment,
although it gives the power to have an
execution issued thereon: Norton v.
Beaver, 5 Ohio 180; Ba v. Wills, 12
Mo. 364; Whiting v.Beebe, 7 Eng. 577;
Mower v. Kip, 6 Paige Ch. 88; Denegre
v. Han, 13 Iowa 240 ; Ez parte Penn
Iron Co., 7 Cow. 540; Graff v. Kip, 1
Edw. Ch. 619. It has been held, that
where land was purchased by sale on an
execution issued on a judgment taken
subsequently to the rendition of another
judgment, and during the existence of
the lien of the latter, the purchaser takes
the land freed from the lien of the older
judgment, if there he no sale under
the latter during the time it was running; and that, too, even if he had
knowledge of such prior lien, and that a
sale by an execution issued on such older
judgment could not extend the lien
thereof: Tufts v. Tufts, 18 Wend. 621,
80. A judgment may become dormant
and thereby lose its lien as against a
mortgage made by the debtor during the
life of the lien. A revival of the judgment cannot affect the mortgage or any
other prior lien: Tracy v. Tracy, 5
McLean 456; Miner v. Wallace, 10
Ohio 403.
And so, where execution is taken out
during the existence of the lien of the
jadgment, and there is no sale of the
real estate bound by the lien, until after
the expiration of the judgment lien,
although a levy may have been made,

the title acquired at such sale is precisely
the same as though the judgment had
never been regarded as a lien: Bagley
v. Ward, 37 Cal. 121 ; Isaac v. Swift,
10 Id. 81; Roe v. Swart, 5 Cowen 294;
Pettit v. Shepherd, 5 Paige 493; Rupert
v. Dantzler, 12 S. & M. 697 ; Darts
v. Ehrman, 20 Penn. St. 258; Beirne v.
Mower, 13 S. & M. 427; Birdweil v.
Cain, 1 Cold. 302; Trapnall v. Richardson, 8 Eng. 543 ; Shaphardv. Bailleul,
3 Tex. 26 ; Dickinson's Lessee v. Collins,
I Swan 516.
There are cases that assert that the
purchaser at a sale on a judgment of
foreclosure, acquires whatever title (as
against all subsequent holders of Hens on
the property, with knowledge of the
mortgage at the time they acquired their
liens) the mortgagor had at the time the
mortgage was executed. And this is
the doctrine of all the cases, even where
it is held the mortgage lien is merged in
the judgment of foreclosure. Thus, no
inference can be drawn from these cases,
that the judgment extends the mortgage
lien. The writer has found no case that
holds, that the judgment has the effect to
add to the length of the mortgage Hen.
The cases cited on the extension ofjudgment lien by renewal of the judgment,
or by execution, are in perfect harmony
with the theory, that the mortgage lien
cannot be extended by judgment. In
this country the tacking of mortgages, or
judgment liens, has never been accepted
as a rule of property. Possibly the only
instance in which it has been asserted a
Hen is merged in a judgment, and the
latter gives effect to the lien from the date
of its acquisition, is in the case of an
attachment. Concerning an attachment
Hen it may be observed, that so long as
the attachment proceedings continue in
fieri, the lien exists, even if that is
twenty years. When the judgment is
rendered, it is said the attachment proceedings -are sustained. But the lien
thus acquired by the attachment proceedings dies, when the vitality of the judg-
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nient as a power to enforce a sale ceases.
So long as the judgment itself exists as
a lien, just so long the attaclunent lien
can be enforced by sale, and no longer,

6ST

It would then seem that the judgmcnt in
attachment, is only for the purpose of
enforcing a prior lien', obtained by an
extraordinary proceeding.
W. W. THOIRTON.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. ANDERSON.
Where a party through a mistaken view of his legal rights, pays money without
legal or moral consideration, and which in equity and conscience the other party
ought not to retain, the party paying may recover it back in equity. The maxim
ignorantialegis non excnsat does not apply to such a case.
The above rule applied to a case of payment of illegal taxes to a municipal corporation, although both the city and the taxpayer were, in good faith, of opinion at
the time of payment that the tax was legal.
A payment of taxes made in ignorance of the fact that the taxation is void. with
knowledge that a compulsory process is at hand to coerce the demand, must be
regarded as involuntary, and the party is entitled to recover his money.
Where a party can plead and make his defence, a payment under protest will b
regarded as voluntary; or if he has an option to either litigate the question or to
submit to the demand and pay the money, in all sucl cases, there is no compulsion,
and relief will be denied.
In actions for relief for fraud or mistake, the cause of action under-the statuteg
of Kentucky, is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of tie fraud or
mistake.

from the Louisville Chancery Court.
This was a bill in equity by George W. Anderson and others
against the city of Louisville, in which it is alleged that the plaintiffs are the owners of certain real estate within the corporate
limits of the city of Louisville, a municipal corporation created by
the law of the state; that this corporation for a number of years
not only claimed the right, but did, in fact, tax the lands of the
plaintiffs (now appellees) for its own municipal purposes, and to
defray the expenses of its municipal government; that the land
had been used during those years for farming purposes, and that
the bame had never been appropriated to, or used for, city purAPPEAL

poses, and that the jurisdiction, authority and government of the
city are of no use or benefit to the land or its owner; that the ex
tension of the boundary of the city so as to embrace this land was
to enable the corporation to tax it, and thereby increase its revenue, and for no other purpose; that the taxation was unjust and
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illegal, and is not now imposed on the land; and that said city
authorities have, since the collection of these taxes, expressly declared that this land was not the subject of taxation, nor does the
corporation now claim or assert the right to tax this property. The
appellees also alleged that they paid these taxes under a mistake
of law and fact, and in ignorance of their rights, and when they
believed the city, by reason of its charter, had the right not only
to extend its boundaries, but, when extended, had the right to tax
all property within its corporate limits, and being satisfied, the
same was a legal charge on the land, and that the corporation
would proceed, as it threatened to do, to coerce a payment by a
sale of the property, and that the corporation, on a proper demand
made, refused to refund the money wrongfully collected.
The city denied that the payments were made under a mistake
of law or fact, and alleged that, in view of the location of the
land, and its relation to the city population and improvements,
the right of the corporation to tax was at least questionable, and
the appellees, with a full knowledge of all the facts, consented to the
tax, and paid it voluntarily and without even a protest. The corporation also pleaded the five years' Statute of Limitations, and
the appellees replied that they did not discover the mistake made
by them as to their legal rights until the 10th of January 1877, to
which there is no rejoinder.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRYoR, J.-It is plain, if the decision of this court in the case of
Courtney v. City, is adhered to, 12 Bush 319, that the corporation
had no right to levy these taxes, and equally as clear that the appellees paid them under the mistaken belief that the city had the right
to impose the burden. There was no question raised between the
corporation and these taxpayers as to their liability for the tax, and
therefore it was not paid by way of compromise, or when the appellees had reason to doubt the exercise of such a power on the
part of the corporation. It is maintained by counsel for the city,
in an argument of much force, and not wanting in authority to
support it, that, although the city may have had no right to tax
this property, and the payment of the tax was made by appellees
under a mistake as to their legal rights, they cannot recover back
the money. This is the sole question in the case.
A demurrer was filed by the city to the several petitions, but
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that pleading presents the same question as that arising from the
proof. This court will assume, without discussing the facts of the
case, that the corporation exceeded its power in levying this tax
and requiring its payment. The proof is conclusive on that question. It is argued by counsel for the city, that this question does
not arise upon any contract made between the corporation and the
taxpayer, but by reason of a contribution imposed by the former on
the latter for public purposes; and when this burden is imposed,
there is a moral and political duty resting on the citizen to discharge it; and although the tax is unconstitutional, yet, if voluntarily paid, it cannot be recovered back.
In the case of Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana 809, this court
said: " When it can be made perfectly evident, that the only consideration of a contract was a mistake as to the legal rights or
obligations of the parties; and when there has been no fair compromise of bona fide and doubtful claims, we do not doubt that the
agreement might be avoided, on the ground of a clear mistake of
law, and a total want therefore of consideration or mutuality."
This doctrine had been previously announced by this court in the
case of Fitzqeraldv. Peek, 4 Litt. 25, and was followed in the case
of Bay v. Bank, 3 B. Mon. 510, in which it is said: "Whenever, by a clear and palpable mistake of law or fact, essentially
bearing upon and affecting the contract, money has been paid without cause or consideration, which in law, honor, or conscience was
not due and payable, and which in honor and good conscience
ought not to be retained, it ought to be recovered back." The
same doctrine has also been recognised in numerous other cases
decided by this court, in all of which the court has been careful to
say, in substance, that when the parties are differing as to whether
a contract was entered into, or the nature and character of its
stipulations, or have made a compromise of an honest and bona fide
claim, the chancellor will not grant relief on the ground either of
a mistake of law or fact. The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in
Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, says: "We mean distinctly to
assert, that when money is paid by one under a mistake of his
rights and duty, and which he was under no legal or moral obligation to pay, and which the recipient has no right in good conscience
to retain, it may be recovered back, whether such mistake be one
of fact or law; and this, we insist, may be done both upon the
principle of Christian morals and the common law." In the class
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of cases arising on contracts, in which such relief has been granted,
and when the parties not only contract but are competent to understand their business transactions, a much stronger case it seems to
us should appear evidencing the mistake complained of, than in
cases where corporations, invested with the power to tax, assume
to exercise the power in plain violation of the constitutional rights
of the citizen. The citizen has no voice in imposing the burden,
and must submit to a proper exercise of the power, however onerous it may be; and in determining whether the legislative action
of the state and city government in such cases, is within constitutional limits, he has the right to presume the perfect legality of
such action, and the maxim, ignorantialegis non excusat does not
apply. Ignorance of law will not excuse one from the violation of
either the criminal or penal laws of his country, nor will it ordinarily relieve him from mistakes committed in the business transactions of life; but he is not presumed to know more than those
who constitute the legislative and executive departments of the
government under which he lives, whether state or municipal, and
if relief can be granted in reference to contracts between individuals, the stronger the necessity for the interposition of the chancellor in a case like this, where the burden is not self-imposed, or
discharged by reason of any moral or political duty. While the
payment of taxes is both a legal and moral duty, no obligation
rests on the citizen to pay or submit to a void assessment; and
when he pays an unauthorized tax, having discharged the burden as
a law-abiding citizen, he had the right to believe, when making the
payment that there had been no abuse of the power to tax, by those
to whom it had been confided. Instead of punishing the citizen
for complying with what he believed to be his duty, by withholding from him the money he has wrongfully paid, he should be
encouraged to assume such burdens instead of resisting the collection; and this should be done by refunding him the money paid,
when there was no legal or moral obligation upon him to make the
payment, nor any legal or moral right on the part of the city to
make the demand or collect the money.
It is true that Cooley on Taxation lays down the doctrine "that
a tax voluntarily paid cannot be recovered back ;" or says, that it
has been held by the authorities, with a very few exceptions; and
"that it is immateriJl in such a case that the tax is illegally laid,
or even that the law under which it was laid was unconstitutional,
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Every man is supposed to know the law, and if he voluntarily makes
a payment which the law would not compel him to make, he cannot afterwards assign his ignorance of the law as the reason why
the state should furnish him with legal remedies to recover it
back."
He further says, "all payments of taxes are supposed to be voluntary which are not made under protest or under the apparent
compulsion of legal process." In Sheldon v. School Distrct, 24
Conn. 88, it was held, "if one's land is sold for taxes after protest, and he buys it in, it must be regarded as a voluntary payment,
and will give him no right of action." In the case of Taylor v.
Board of Realth, 31 Penn. St. 73, the taxes had been levied
under an unconstitutional law and paid for a series of years.
When an action was brought to recover it back, the court said:
"The money was paid without dispute, and he thus assented to the
collection of tax for public purposes, and of course to the application of it." Relief was denied.
In Town Council v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400, it was held that the
payment of money to a town clerk as the price of a license under
an ordinance, afterwards declared void, could not be recovered
back. All these and many more cases referred to sustain the
position assumed by the attorney for the city; but in the last
named case, in denying a recovery for money paid under the void
ordinance, the court distinguishes that case from one where money
has been paid in discharge of a void assessment of taxes, because
in the latter case there was an apparent means of enforcing the
illegal demand without resort to judicial proceeding, and without
giving the party a day in court: Wiley v. Parmer,14 Ala. 627,
Crutchfield v. Wood, 16 Id. 702.
While this court recognises the rule laid down in Cooley, and
the decisions following it, we differ in the conclusion reached as to
what constitutes a voluntary payment of taxes. In the case of
the City of Covington v. Powell, 2 Met. 226, Powell instituted an
action against the corporation, in which it is alleged, "that the
money paid by the plaintiff was paid as taxes based on an illegal
assessment made by the city, and in ignorance of his rights, or of
the fact the assessment was illegal, but he believed at the time it
was legal and collectible." The city did not controvert the fact
that the assessment was void, but pleaded' that the plaintiff was
apprised by the law and facts when he paid the taxes, and with
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such knowledge made the payments voluntarily, and further
averred, "that the appellant had enjoyed the benefits from the improvements made by the money collected under the assessment in
common with the other inhabitants of the city." It was held in
that case that the promptitude and obedience of the plaintiff to
what he supposed was the law, should not prejudice his right to
reclaim the money paid, if paid wrongfidly and in ignorance of his
rights, nor did it appear that he or his property had received any
special or direct benefit from the money paid, and therefore a recovery could not be denied. The judgment of the court below was
affirmed, and the money improperly collected ordered to be restored. In the case of Mity of Louisville v. Henning, 1 Bush 381,
the latter sued the city to recover back a sum of money paid under
an invalid assessment, alleging that the plaintiffs paid the money
in ignorance of their rights. The city denied that the tax was
unauthorized and invalid, but admitted that if no lawful authority
existed to impose the tax, then plaintiffs paid the money in ignorance of their rights. This court held the taxation unauthorized in
that case, and affirmed the judgment of the court below requiring
the city to refund the money. The plaintiffs in that case knew as
much of the law and facts applicable to their rights as the plaintiffs in the present case. They knew their property had been
taxed, and believed the city authorities had the power to impose
the burden, and for that reason paid it. These cases were followed
by the case of the Cty of Bowling Green v. Elrod (not yet
reported), and we find no decision of this court in conflict with the
doctrine recognised and established in these cases.
In the present case, both the city and the appellees acted in good
faith. They both believed the taxation to be constitutional, until
it was finally made to appear that both were mistaken, and that
the city had received the money of appellees without any consideration. There was no contract or bargain in this case by which one
undertook to pay, and the other to receive. The money was not
paid at the instance of the taxpayer to one who was a mere passive agent, without authority to demand or coerce payment, but to
one who had not only the authority to receive it, but to exact payment by levying on the property taxed, and upon the refusal of
the appellees to pay, a sale of the property was inevitable. The
party charged with payment has been afforded no opportunity of
being heard, and knows that the tax-gatherer is clothed with the
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process of the law to enforce his demand if payment is denied.
Such a payment, or a payment made in ignorance of the fact that
the taxation is void, with a knowledge that compulsory process is
at hand to coerce the demand, must be regarded as involuntary,
and the party entitled to recover his money.
Where a party is entitled to a day in court, and can litigate the
demand about to be enforced against him, but instead of doing so
voluntarily pays it, he is without remedy. When he can plead
and make his defence, a payment made under protest will be regarded as voluntary, or if he has an option either to litigate the
question or submit to the demands and pay the money, in all such
cases there is no compulsion, and relief will be denied: Benson v.
Monroe, 7 Cush. 131.
In the case of the Town Council of Calistiav. Burnet, already
cited, where money was paid to the clerk of the town in order to
obtain a license to retail liquor, and the ordinance requiring the
license was subsequently held void, it was adjudged that no recovery could be had of the money paid to the clerk, as there was no
proof the payment was coerced, or any summary process compelling its payment. The party could have refused to pay the money,
or could have tested the validity of the ordinance without subjecting himself to a penalty, or could at least have refrained from selling his liquor or goods. The payment of taxes is regarded as
involuntary, because the tax collector has the authority to levy and
sell on the refusal to pay. The process is summary, and in the
hands of the party making the demand, and the taxpayer must
submit to the levy or pay the money. The distinction is plain
between such cases, and where the one making the payment is
himself claiming the right, and the recipient of the money the
mere passive agent of the corporation. We do not mean to be
understood in recognising this distinction as assenting to the doctrine that no recovery can be had in any case when the money
sought to be recovered has been paid under a mistake of law, and
without compulsion.
As to the plea of the Statute of Limitations, we should have no
hesitation in confining the appellees to a recovery within five years
next preceding the commencement of the action, but for the statute
providing that "in actions for relief for fraud, or mistake, or
damages for either, the cause of action shall not be deemed to
have accrued until the discovery of the fraud or mistake; but no
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such action shall be brought ten years after the time of making
the contract, or the perpetration of the fraud :" General Statutes
sect. 6, of art. 3, chap. 71. In this case, the appellees, to avoid
the plea of the statute, reply that they did not discover the mistake until a fixed period, and to this reply there is no rejoinder;
so the matter in avoidance stands confessed, and must be taken as
true. We do not mean to adjudge that a decision of this court
determining such taxation illegal and void will control the decision
as to wren this discovery alleged by the appellee was first made,
as such a decision can afford no guide in determining the issue.
The party is required to show, where the mistake originates from
his own action as well as that of another, that he has exercised
such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in ascertaining
what his rights are, and five years in which- to make such a discovery should certainly be held sufficient. In this case, however,
the mistake was mutual, and both acted during the whole period
as if the right to demand and receive was unquestioned. Whether
this should alter the rule as to diligence, is not necessary to inquire,
as the pleadings settle that question.
Judgment affirmed.
I. The decision in the principal case
presents to us some new and interesting
points in the law of taxation. It asserts
a doctrine familiar to the law of Kentucky, to wit: money paid under a mistake of law can be recovered back in a
court of equity; but one which is not
recognised in the majority of the other
states. Against this doctrine we have
the principle laid down in Burroughs on
Taxation 266, "It is a well settled principle of la*, that a voluntary payment
of money under mistake of law, lays no
foundation to recover back the money so
paid. When a man demands money of
another as a matter of right, and that
other with a full knowledge of the facts
upon which the demand is founded, has
paid a sum of money voluntarily, he cannot recover it back."
"The rule, that mistake in matter of
law cannot be admitted as a valid excuse,
either for doing an act prohibited by law,
or for the omission of a duty which it im-

poses, is common to all systems of law.
'R egula est juris ignorantiam cu-que
nocere,' is the language of the Pandects.
'Ignorantia juris non excusat,' is the
maxim of the common law :" Kerr on
Fraud and Mistake 396.
"1The rule is the same in equity, mistake in the matter of law cannot, in
general, be admitted as a ground of
relief in equity :" Bank of the United
States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32; Hunt v.
.Rousmaniere, I Id. 1 ; McMurray v. St.
Louis, 4-c., Co., 33 Mo. 377 ; Peters v.
.Rorence, 38 Penn. St. 194 ; Giwynn v.
Hamilton, 29 Ala. 233; Lyon v. Sanders,
23 Miss. 530 ; Bryant v. Mansfield, 22
Me. 360; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns.
Ch. 166 ; Mellish v. Bobertson, 25 Vt.
603; Smith v. McDougal, 2 Cal. 586.
These are the general principles assumed by many of the states, in reference to the law of mistake ; but con
fining it to the principle, enunciated
in the principal case, we find opposed
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the doctrine -aid down in Kerr on
Fraud and Mistake 401, as follows:
"It appears from the authorities to be
established in equity, as well as law,

that money paid under a mistake of law,
with full knowledge of the facts, is not
recoverable ; and that even a promise to
pay, upon a supposed liability, and in ignorance of the law, will bind tile party."
Bilbie v. Lurdey. 2 East 469; Stafford v. Stafford, 1DeG. & J. 197 ; Bate
v. Hooper, 5 D., M. &G. 338; Elliott v.
Swartout, 10 Pet. 137 ; Wheaton v.
Wheaton, 9 Conn. 96 ; Pinkham v. Gear,
3 N. H. 163; Hubbard v. Martin, 8
Yerg. 498; Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow.
674.
With these authorities the principal
case is distinctly opposed, as tile Court
of Appeals, in their learned and exhaustive decision, assert the contrary
doctrine.
In Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana
314, the court say, by RoBERTSON, J. :

"It is well known, that all persons do
not understand some of the plainest principles of law, and that no person, however enlightened, knows all the law.
And if one ignorant of a plain principle
of law, without any other motive or consideration than an erroneous opinion
respecting l1s equal rights and obligations, releases a right or pays money, or
undertakes to do any act, what principle
of law or dictate of justice or policy,
would require him to be bound as with a
Gordian knot, which nothing but the
sword could unloose? Why should he
be punished in such case for such ignorance ? Or, why should the other party
be enriched without any equivalent or
merit of any kind to any extent whatever? A mistake of fact might be sufficient to entitle to relief or exoneration.
Might not a mistake of law, in a parallel
case, be equally availing, and for precisely the same reason ? Undoubtedly
it might, and we think it should." Following the above decision 'we have in

Kentucky, the cases as follows: Ray v.
Bankof Kentucky, 3 B. Mon. 512 ; Gratz
v. Redd, 4 Id. 190; Louisville v. Zanone,
I Met. 153; City of'Covington v. Powell,
2 Id. 228 ; Louisville v. Henning et al.,
I Bush 383.
"It is a universal principle founded
in reason, that no one is entitled to have
or retain that which ex aquo et bono,
belongs to another; a principle found
in every code, and circumscribed in its
application only by positive rules, founded
on the convenience and necessities of
mankind :"1Lawrence v. Beaubien, 2
Bailey 623; Lowndes v. Cissobn, 2 MeCord Ch. 455.
Thus does the South Carolina court
adhere to the Kentucky doctrine. In
Lammot v. Bowly, 6 Har. & Johns. 525,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland say:
"Where the legal principle is doubtful and one about which ignorance may
be well supposed to exist, a person's acting under a mistake of law is a ground
for relief in equity."
In Bize v. Dickason, I T. R. 285, Lord
MANSFIELD says: "Where money was
paid under a mistake, where there was
no ground to claim in conscience, the
party may recover' it back again in this
See Northrop v.
kind of action."
Graves, 19 Conn. 548.
The
Law is a progressive science.
nearer it approximates to natural justice
as developed by the right use of reason,
the better it answers the ends for which
it is created. That every man should
know the law is prima facie absurd and
unjust. The greater number of the cases
forbidding recovery for mistake of law
proceed upon that maxim. Those courts
act, too, upon the erroneous idea that by
so doing they are acting upon a profound
public policy, which forbids the encum.
brance of court dockets with too multitidinous cases.
By advancing public policy they deny
substantial justice, punishing the inno.
cent they reward one who has advanced
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no consileration for the benefit received.
A higher consideration of public policy
is, that all peoples should believe that
strict justice should be meted out in every
case. When this is not done, a greater
injury is accomplished than could possibly
be done otherwise. Precedents must
and do have proper weight, but where
they are shown to be inconsistent with
reason they should not be adhered to.
This, I suggest, the first class ofcases are,
and that the second are the cases which
display sound reason and correct public
policy.
They, the latter, assert that A. shall
not be benefited, having advanced no
consideration, by B.'s mistake, and that
A. shall repay. What could be more
reasonable and just? Always compelling the proof of mistake to be clear
and positive, the latter cases show the
true rule to be followed. I think, with
great'deference, that the principal case
has the dear weight of reasonand justice,
and that while it is opposed to very eminent authorities, it correotly enunciates
the true rule to be followed in such
cases.
II. As to the second principle in the
case, to wit: That where a municipal
corporation has the power to sell property, as if under execution, without
proceedings at law, a payment to prevent
such sale amounts in law to duress.
"Where there has been no actual contract, but money has been extorted by
luress under circumstances which give
to the transaction the character of pay-

ment by compulsion, it may be recovered
back :" Parsons on Cont., vol. 1, 395;
Chase v. Dwinal, 7 Greenl. 134. "Duress is either of the person or the goods
of the party, and the former is either by
imprisonment by threats or by an exhibition of force which apparently cannot
be resisted :" Cooley on Torts 506.
"Duress of goods consists in demanding
and taking personal property under color
of legal authority, which, in fact, is either
void, or for some other reason does not justify the demand :" Cooley on Torts 507 ;
First Nat. Bank v. Watkins, 21 Mich.
483; Beckwith v. Frisbie, 32 Vt. 559;
Adams v. Beeves, 68 N. C. 134.
" Money extorted by any undue advantage taken of the party's situation, contrary to laws for the protection of persons under those circumstances," can be
recovered back in an action for money
had and received: Smith Lead. Cas.
*395 n.
In the-case of Boston Glass Co. v.
Boston, 4 Met. (Mass.) 187, it was held
that taxes illegally claimed by the city
of Boston as due by the Boston Glass
Company and paid by the latter with
full knowledge of all the facts and law,
could be recovered back at law.
This case was decided.on the sole
ground of compulsion. The question of
mistake not arising.
This decision, which is important and
learned, we think is sustained by th?
weight of reason if not of authority.
A. G. SimRAL.
Cincinnati.

